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 1321 
STATISTICALLY SPEAKING: RESTRICTIVE 
CHANGES TO FAIR HOUSING ACT 
DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY 
Abstract: Disparate impact liability, a theory for pleading discrimination allega-
tions, has been an important tool in the battle for housing equity. Disparate im-
pact claims, however, have undergone drastic changes since their inception in 
1971. Most recently, the Department of Housing and Urban Development issued 
a final rule amending the pleading requirements for litigants alleging disparate 
impact housing claims. The new rule threatens to undermine the development of 
disparate impact claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) of 1968, which gives 
plaintiffs access to relief, specifically in cases of lending discrimination. This 
Note analyzes the rule in light of a seminal 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision, 
Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities 
Project, Inc., which recognized disparate impact claims under the FHA. Ulti-
mately, an FHA disparate impact rule should balance the need for plaintiffs to 
reach the discovery phase of litigation to uncover discriminatory animus versus 
defendants’ ability to justify policies with legitimate purposes. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the 1950s, Ford Motor Company opened a new manufacturing plant in 
the town of Milpitas, California.1 The company transferred 1,400 employees, 
including 250 Black employees, to meet the staffing demands in Milpitas.2 To 
address the incoming wave of employee housing needs, the Federal Housing 
Administration approved and insured subdivision plans on single-family 
homes for development.3 Simultaneously, the Veterans Administration guaran-
teed the buyers’ mortgages on the homes.4 Even though Black employees were 
similarly situated to white home buyers, Milpitas excluded Black individuals 
                                                                                                                           
 1 RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR GOVERN-
MENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 9 (2017). 
 2 Id. 
 3 Id. Congress created the Federal Housing Administration in 1934 to revitalize the lending mar-
ket by insuring approved-lender mortgages. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA), HUD.GOV, 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/fhahistory [https://perma.cc/BSB5-VW5V]; see also 
David Reiss, Underwriting Sustainable Homeownership: The Federal Housing Administration and 
the Low Down Payment Loan, 50 GA. L. REV. 1019, 1034–35 (2016) (summarizing the purpose of the 
Federal Housing Administration as an insurance guarantor for private mortgages). 
 4 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 9 n.*. Under the Servicemen’s Readjustment Act of 1944, the Vet-
erans Administration (VA) issued low interest rate loans to veterans. April Johnson, Comment, Fair 
Housing Issues: A Call for Mandated Housing Integration, 50 U. TOL. L. REV. 107, 115–16 (2018). 
These loans required no down payments, but the VA discriminated by redlining in a way similar to the 
Federal Housing Administration’s practices. Id. 
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from owning homes and the city’s zoning laws forbade the construction of 
apartments.5 Without the ability to own a home or rent an apartment, Black 
individuals like Frank Stevenson, an educated Ford utility worker, had no choice 
but to commute over one hour in each direction to the plant.6 Stevenson was 
never able to move closer to the plant and made this same trip for twenty years 
until he retired.7 Only one of the eight Black individuals with whom Stevenson 
carpooled was able to move closer to the plant throughout his employment.8 
Stevenson’s story demonstrates an aspect of the long, ugly, and under 
scrutinized history of housing discrimination in the United States.9 In 1933, 
following the Great Depression, Congress passed the Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation Act to create the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC).10 The 
HOLC was President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal effort to revitalize 
lending in the housing market.11 Congress intended for the HOLC to both re-
finance metropolitan mortgages on the brink of foreclosure and finance favor-
able loans of those who defaulted on their mortgages.12 The HOLC’s four-
category rating system was used to evaluate lending risk, however, it signifi-
                                                                                                                           
 5 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 9–10. Generally, the phrase “similarly situated” connotes funda-
mental ideas of equal protection by assessing the relationship between the reasonableness of classify-
ing an individual and the purpose of a particular law. See Giovanna Shay, Similarly Situated, 18 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 581, 612–15 (2011) (explaining that the term “similarly situated” has a complicated 
legal history). Originally, the phrase meant that legislation could not help or hinder a particular class. 
See id. at 601 (discussing interpretations of “similarly situated” in the 1885 U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion Barbier v. Connolly). Later, courts used the term to connect the classification and the legislative 
intent. Id. at 612. Some lower courts used “similarly situated” as a minimum bar for equal protection 
claims. Id. at 615. The preferred understanding of the term, however, focuses on the relationship be-
tween a protected class and the purpose of a law. Id. This allows a court to frame the law in a way that 
resonates with the equal protection issues and better guides the legislature. Id. 
 6 ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 10. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See id. at xii (stating that housing discrimination was a national, federally-sponsored, and tar-
geted project). For example, the Federal Housing Administration implemented one policy that would 
undervalue racially mixed urban areas making them unsuitable for mortgage refinancing. See DOUG-
LAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF 
THE UNDERCLASS 51–54 (1993) (explaining that starting in the 1930s, the federal government admin-
istered sets of policies to promote lending and housing discrimination in minority neighborhoods). 
The Federal Housing Administration dubbed another policy “inharmonious racial or nationality 
groups” in its Underwriting Manual. Id. at 54. The manual stated that “[i]f a neighborhood is to retain 
stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied by the same social and racial 
classes.” Id. (quoting U.S. FED. HOUS. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL: UNDERWRITING AND 
VALUATION PROCEDURE UNDER TITLE II OF THE NATIONAL HOUSING ACT pt. 2, § 9, ¶ 937 (1938) 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/sites/default/files/pdf/Federal-Housing-Administration-Underwriting-
Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/96U3-GWCB]). To achieve this goal, the agency encouraged racially 
restrictive covenants. Id.; see also, e.g., infra notes 10–15 and accompanying text (outlining other 
instances of federal discrimination policies). 
 10 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 9, at 51. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
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cantly devalued diverse urban neighborhoods.13 These practices made the 
HOLC one of the first instances of the federal institutionalization of redlining 
and other discriminatory lending practices.14 In addition to other government-
sponsored actions, federal policies that followed the HOLC made it nearly im-
possible for minority individuals to obtain federally-sponsored and insured 
loans between the 1930s and 1970s.15 
Legislators recognized the need to take decisive action to solve the omni-
present discriminatory housing issues.16 In 1968, Congress passed Title VIII of 
                                                                                                                           
 13 Id. Although the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) did not invent the four-category 
loan risk standards, which were widely used in the 1920s, it was the first to implement the standards 
on a mass scale. Id. at 52. The HOLC identified four categories of neighborhoods: (1) Green, (2) Blue, 
(3) Yellow, and (4) Red. Joyce A. Baugh, School Desegregation in Metropolitan Detroit: Struggling 
for Justice in a Divided and Troubled Community, in THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC EQUALI-
TY IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS: MENDEZ, BROWN, AND BEYOND 177, 180 (Kristi L. Bowman ed., 
2015). The HOLC marked neighborhoods with Black residents as Red. Id. The HOLC issued the most 
loans to Green and Blue—the contemporary, monocultural, and alluring neighborhoods—and it issued 
very few to Yellow and Red regions—the blue-collar, Black, or Black-adjacent neighborhoods. Id. 
This practice denotes the beginning of redlining. Id.; see also Assocs. Home Equity Servs., Inc. v. 
Troup, 778 A.2d 529, 537 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (defining redlining as geographically 
denying credit for discriminatory reasons).  
 14 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 9, at 51. The practices of the HOLC influenced the for-
mation and operation of the Federal Housing Administration and the VA, which eliminated private 
bank risk by guaranteeing the value of homes. Id. at 52–53. Although these federal agencies made 
home ownership achievable for the masses by minimizing bank risk, they also encouraged “the selec-
tive out-migration of middle-class whites to the suburbs,” and favored single-family homes over mul-
ti-family units. Id. at 53. Not only did the organizations promote lending discrimination in the public 
sector by using maps to track the migration patterns of Black and other non-white minority families 
for the suitability of loans, but they also encouraged private discrimination by promoting racially 
restrictive covenants. Id. at 53–54; see also Baugh, supra note 13, at 179 (defining restrictive cove-
nants as court-enforced “private contractual agreements among property owners, specifying that the 
buyer and seller may not sell or lease property to [B]lacks and sometimes other groups, such as Jews 
or Catholics, for a designated period of time”). The HOLC mapping practices constitute a form of 
redlining, or denying credit to a geographic location for discriminatory purposes. See Assocs. Home 
Equity Servs., Inc., 778 A.2d at 537 (highlighting that the term redlining originated from organizations 
physically marking red lines on maps to identify areas unworthy of credit). Additionally, reverse red-
lining is similarly designating those areas for unfavorable credit terms. Id.; see also infra notes 166–
177 and accompanying text (explaining the types of unfavorable credit terms). 
 15 See MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 9, at 53–54 (emphasizing that suburban homeownership 
only became widely available to white individuals between 1934 and 1969). In addition, other public 
forms of housing discrimination emerged through exclusionary zoning. Jon C. Dubin, From Junk-
yards to Gentrification: Explicating a Right to Protective Zoning in Low-Income Communities of 
Color, 77 MINN. L. REV. 739, 773–79 (1993) (explaining that municipalities have subjected commu-
nities of color to zoning and land use discrimination). In some places, such as the Township of Mount 
Laurel, municipalities enacted general zoning ordinances, which effectively prevented low- and mid-
dle-income persons from acquiring affordable homes. See, e.g., S. Burlington Cnty. NAACP v. Twp. 
of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 717, 723 (N.J. 1975) (opining that the issue of towns enacting zoning 
ordinances to engage in economic discrimination is not unique to this area). 
 16 See supra notes 1–15 and accompanying text (describing the problematic federal and private 
discriminatory policies and practices requiring resolution); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (outlining the 
Fair Housing Act’s (FHA) goal to achieve housing equity). 
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the Civil Rights Act, commonly known as the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which 
makes it illegal to discriminate on the basis of a protected class in the housing 
market.17 Nevertheless, following the market collapse in 2008, it became clear 
that discrimination was still an issue affecting racial and ethnic minorities in the 
housing market on a large scale.18 The collapse exposed financial institutions’ 
practice of lending to similarly situated people of color on egregious terms.19 
                                                                                                                           
 17 See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (prohibiting discrimination in various aspects of the housing market). 
Protected classes under the FHA are race, color, religion, national origin, sex, physical and mental 
handicaps, and familial status. Id.; see also infra note 37 and accompanying text (defining protected 
classes under the FHA). 
 18 See KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, 
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 21–22 (2011) (analyzing, retroactively, the causes of the 
global housing market collapse throughout the 2000s). The housing market collapse in 2008 led to a 
global financial crisis. Charles W. Murdoch, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act: What Caused the Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 
SMU L. REV. 1243, 1244 (2011). During the financial crisis, housing prices plummeted and home-
owners who lost their jobs also defaulted on their mortgages, the effects of which led to the downfall 
of multi-billion-dollar institutions, such as Lehman Brothers. Id. at 1244–46, 1295, 1314–17. The 
crisis is generally characterized by a lack of governmental housing policy, which allowed banks to 
issue millions of high-risk mortgages. Id. at 1249. These high-risk mortgages constituted half of the 
entire U.S. mortgage market. Id. at 1248. Furthermore, the crisis involved several key players. Id. at 
1255. First, ambitious borrowers sought to purchase homes they could not afford. Id at 1255–56. Sec-
ond, the misaligned interests of mortgage brokers led them to convince borrowers to purchase high-
risk loans by using fraudulent tactics. See id. at 1258–61 (noting that a broker may have an agency 
relationship with qualified borrowers, but still push them towards subprime mortgages). Third, mort-
gage lenders, the unregulated non-bank institutions funded by investment and commercial banks, 
ignored the ability of borrowers to repay their mortgages. Id. at 1261–62, 1266. The transition from 
manually confirming a borrower’s creditworthiness to using complex algorithms made this process 
easier. See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra, at 16–17 (describing the transition to automated underwriting); 
CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND 
THREATENS DEMOCRACY 141–42 (2016) (same). At this point, once the broker and lender sold a loan, 
they collected their fees up front, and they no longer cared whether the borrower would repay. Mur-
doch, supra, at 1266, 1271. The lenders would then sell the loans to two types of entities for securiti-
zation, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and investment banks. Id. at 1271. Fourth, GSEs, 
such as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, bundled the loans to create and sell mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs), which are bonds supported by mortgages as collateral. Id. at 1272; see ENGEL & MCCOY, 
supra, at 44 (defining MBSs). Fifth, investment banks similarly created private-label securities 
(PLSs), similar to MBSs but securitized by non-GSEs. Murdoch, supra, at 1272; see ENGEL & 
MCCOY, supra, at 18 (defining PLSs). Sixth, credit rating agencies gave MBSs and PLSs favorable 
ratings even though they were high-risk. Id. at 1301–03. GSEs and investment banks structured the 
securities into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), consisting of both stable and unstable loans. Id. 
at 1249 n.27. When the investors purchased the CDOs, they would also purchase credit default swaps 
(CDSs) from the seventh key player—issuers of derivatives—who essentially transferred the risk of 
default to the issuer of the CDOs. Id. at 1312 & n.423, 1313. Because of a lack of regulation, these 
key players were able to create the perfect storm for a financial crisis when the housing market col-
lapsed. Id. at 1249. 
 19 Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage Discrimination, and 
the Fair Housing Act, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375, 398 (2010). Originally, lending discrimina-
tion focused solely on denying credit for discriminatory reasons. John Yinger, Discrimination in 
Mortgage Lending: A Literature Review, in MORTGAGE LENDING, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, AND 
FEDERAL POLICY 29, 30 (John Goering & Ron Wienk eds., 1996) (stating that a denial of loan ap-
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To remedy these types of situations, plaintiffs can bring discrimination 
claims in two ways under the FHA.20 First, plaintiffs can assert intentional dis-
crimination.21 Second, plaintiffs can assert disparate impact claims as allega-
tions of facially neutral policies or practices that result in discriminatory ef-
fects, regardless of intent.22 In 2020, the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD) finalized a rule to alter the way disparate impact claims 
are pleaded and reviewed.23 This new rule replaced the prior three-part burden-
shifting framework with a complex and onerous pleading requirement, thus 
allowing for sweeping affirmative defenses.24 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of liability under the FHA and 
discusses how plaintiffs can bring housing discrimination claims under the 
statute.25 This Part also considers how the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision 
in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communi-
ties Project, Inc. influenced the HUD and its proposed implementation of the 
FHA’s disparate impact standard.26 Part II then discusses the implications of 
trends in FHA disparate impact claims and, in particular, the applicability of 
FHA disparate impact on lending discrimination.27 Finally, Part III analyzes 
some of the potential effects the proposed disparate impact rule might have on 
these types of housing discrimination claims and suggests an alternative ap-
                                                                                                                           
proval is the most serious and obvious type of lending discrimination). During the financial crisis, 
discrimination occurred through these egregious terms, typically characterized by high interest rates 
and high fees. Schwemm & Taren, supra, at 398. 
 20 DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., 95-710, THE FAIR HOUSING ACT: A LEGAL 
OVERVIEW 5 (2016), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/95-710/23 [https://perma.cc/
SW7A-46YA]. 
 21 Id. Disparate treatment claims use evidence to prove that some impermissible discriminatory 
purpose motivated a defendant’s action. Id.; see infra notes 42–53 and accompanying text (articulating 
the differences between disparate treatment claims based on direct evidence and disparate treatment 
claims based on circumstantial evidence). 
 22 CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 5. Disparate impact claims do not allege that a defendant was 
impermissibly motivated by a discriminatory purpose. Id.; see infra notes 54–79 and accompanying 
text (explaining that disparate impact claims arise from facially neutral policies). Instead, disparate 
impact theories allege that a policy created discriminatory effects, irrespective of motivation. See 
CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 7–8; infra notes 54–79 and accompanying text. 
 23 See 24 C.F.R § 100.500 (2021) (providing a complex burden-shifting framework to replace the 
2013 rule). The rule requires a plaintiff to meet a five-part pleading requirement, and it gives defend-
ants two opportunities to rebut this prima facie case. Id. 
 24 Compare id. (stating that (1) the plaintiff must meet an ambiguous five-part pleading require-
ment to allege that a policy caused discriminatory effects, (2) the defendant can argue three affirma-
tive defenses, (3) the plaintiff must prove all the elements of the pleading, and (4) the defendant has an 
opportunity to allege more affirmative defenses, with no evidentiary requirements), with 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.500 (2013) (implementing a three-part burden-shifting test consisting of (1) the plaintiff alleg-
ing a practice caused discriminatory effects, (2) the defendant proving that the practice is necessary, 
and (3) the plaintiff proving that the defendant’s interest could be achieved in a less restrictive way). 
 25 See infra notes 29–80 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 81–149 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 150–191 and accompanying text. 
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proach.28 This Note ultimately argues that the new rule makes it more diffi-
cult—if not impracticable—to bring allegations of disparate impact liability as 
compared to previous standards, and that the change is unsupported by both 
precedent, policy, and empirical data.29 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FHA AND DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY 
The FHA grants legal recourse for discrimination in many segments of the 
housing market.30 Although housing discrimination cases are commonly brought 
under both the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) and the FHA, the Su-
preme Court has only established disparate impact liability for housing discrimi-
nation under the FHA.31 Section A of this Part discusses the language of Title 
VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 and the differences between the two claims 
a plaintiff can advance.32 Section B analyzes a 2015 U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion, Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communi-
ties Project, Inc., a monumental case for FHA disparate impact liability.33 Sec-
tion C then reviews how the Supreme Court’s holding influenced the HUD’s 
decision to revise the standards for pleading an FHA disparate impact case.34 
A. Disparate Impact Liability in the Context of the FHA 
Before exploring the new rule, it is important to understand where the 
HUD bases its statutory authority to regulate disparate impact housing com-
plaints: the FHA.35 The FHA explains that the United States seeks to provide 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 192–242 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 195–224 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 154–163 and accompany-
ing text (supporting the idea that the restrictive changes in the regulation are unsupported by empirical 
data regarding the frequency of disparate impact claims). 
 30 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3607, 3617 (noting it is illegal to discriminate in the context of, 
amongst other things, housing, financing, and brokering, subject to some exemptions). 
 31 Cf. Winnie F. Taylor, The ECOA and Disparate Impact Theory: A Historical Perspective, 26 
J.L. & POL’Y 575, 581 (2018) (arguing that disparate impact liability should be extended to Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) claims). In 2018, Congress passed a resolution barring the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) from establishing disparate impact liability grounded in the 
ECOA against auto lenders. Id. at 580. Nevertheless, there is debate whether the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 2015 analysis in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communi-
ties Project, Inc., allowing for disparate impact liability where a statute includes broad language, per-
mits disparate impact liability under the ECOA. 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2517–18 (2015) (holding that anti-
discrimination statutes, which focus on the effects of an action instead of the motivation, should allow 
for disparate impact claims), remand to 975 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2015), remand to C.A. No. 08-CV-
00546, 2016 WL 4494322 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016); Taylor, supra, at 581 (explaining the potential 
for disparate impact theory in ECOA claims); see also infra notes 101–104 and accompanying text 
(explaining the textual analysis in Inclusive Communities). 
 32 See infra notes 35–79 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 81–121 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 122–149 and accompanying text. 
 35 See 42 U.S.C. § 3601; infra notes 36–41 and accompanying text. 
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fair housing throughout the nation.36 To achieve this goal, the statute makes it 
unlawful to discriminate in the sale or rental of housing, financing of housing, 
or brokerage services based on a protected class.37 Although the FHA is a 
powerful tool for ensuring fair housing, courts generally defer to the HUD’s 
interpretation of the statute.38 
Accordingly, the HUD’s regulations also provide a supplementary list of 
discriminatory conduct prohibited under the FHA.39 These prohibitions include 
(1) refusing the sale or rental of housing, (2) discriminating with the services 
relating to the sale or rental of housing, (3) limiting the actual availability of 
housing, (4) indicating preference or discrimination through advertising prac-
tices, (5) misrepresenting the availability of housing, (6) blockbusting, and (7) 
denying access to business services related to the sale or rental of housing.40 
The FHA, however, exempts five housing categories from these prohibitions: 
(1) owner-sold or rented single-family homes, (2) owner-occupied dwellings 
                                                                                                                           
 36 42 U.S.C. § 3601. 
 37 Id. §§ 3601–3619. Protected classes include race, color, religion, national origin, sex, physical 
and mental handicaps, and familial status. Id.; CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 1. The first iteration of 
the FHA in 1968 prohibited housing discrimination based on race, color, religion, and national origin. 
CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 1. In 1974, Congress included sex discrimination, and in 1988, it added 
physical and mental handicap and familial status to its list of protected classes covered by the FHA. 
Id. Congress also explained that residential real estate financing includes real estate-backed loans, 
selling, brokering, and property appraisal. 42 U.S.C. § 3605. Subsequently, the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (HUD) elaborated that residential real estate financing includes the sec-
ondary mortgage market. CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 1–2.; see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.125 (2021) 
(expanding the scope of coverage to the lending market). 
 38 See Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 107 (1979) (deferring to the HUD’s 
interpretation of the FHA). President Lyndon B. Johnson created HUD in 1965. See Questions and 
Answers About HUD, HUD.GOV, https://www.hud.gov/about/qaintro [https://perma.cc/EN9G-TC5K] 
(explaining that the HUD is a cabinet level department created as part of the War on Poverty). The 
HUD’s stated mission is to provide equal housing opportunities by facilitating a stable housing mar-
ket, supplying affordable housing, and eliminating discrimination. See Mission, HUD.GOV, https://
www.hud.gov/about/mission [https://perma.cc/TY6D-YV6L] (declaring the department’s mission 
statement). To achieve these goals, the HUD implements programs such as insuring mortgages and 
loans, issuing various grants, facilitating low-income rentals and housing, helping the homeless, and, 
importantly, sanctioning discrimination in housing. See Questions and Answers About HUD, supra 
(listing the HUD’s major programs). 
 39 24 C.F.R. § 100.50. 
 40 Id. Blockbusting is convincing homeowners to sell their homes at discounted prices for fear of 
minorities moving in and devaluing their homes. Blockbusting (Block-Busting), THE WOLTERS 
KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION (2012). For example, some real estate compa-
nies hired Black individuals to drive around areas with loud music and scare white families. ROTH-
STEIN, supra note 1, at 95–96. Typically, after purchasing the properties at discounted prices, the 
companies would sell the homes at premium prices to minority families. Id. at 96. In other instances, 
private agreements either restrict availability of housing or completely refuse sales. E.g., id. at 77–78 
(describing restrictive covenants present in deeds). For example, some deeds in Brookline, Massachu-
setts excluded the sale of properties to Black or Irish home buyers. Id. 
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with less than four independent family living quarters, (3) religious organiza-
tions, (4) private clubs, and (5) elderly housing.41 
1. Differences Between Disparate Treatment and Disparate Impact 
Title VIII FHA discrimination claims are typically pleaded under one of 
two theories.42 The first theory—disparate treatment—encompasses allegations 
of intentional discrimination based on either direct or circumstantial or indirect 
evidence.43 Disparate impact claims, on the other hand, stem from “facially 
neutral decision[s]” that have discriminatory effects on a protected class, re-
gardless of motivation.44 Each, however, involves different legal hurdles for a 
plaintiff to overcome before successfully pleading an FHA violation.45 
a. Disparate Treatment: Direct Evidence Versus Indirect and 
Circumstantial Evidence 
Disparate treatment is intentional discrimination based on either direct or 
circumstantial evidence.46 For FHA disparate treatment claims based on direct 
evidence, the plaintiff must present evidence that specifically shows an adverse 
decision against a protected class motivated by discriminatory animus where 
there was no legitimate purpose for such a decision.47 If the plaintiff presents 
enough direct evidence to support the claim, the burden shifts to the defendant 
                                                                                                                           
 41 See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (excluding FHA liability from the sale or rental of single-family 
homes by a private owner without advertising, as well as owner-occupied dwellings with less than 
four units); id. § 3607(a)–(b) (excluding certain actions from FHA liability by religious groups, pri-
vate clubs, and housing for the elderly). 
 42 CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 5. The disparate treatment and disparate impact theories are 
often misunderstood or mistaken for one another. See Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate 
Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 
97 (2006) (explaining that the commonly confusing distinctions between disparate impact and dispar-
ate treatment require clarification). 
 43 CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 5. 
 44 Id. at 7–8 (alteration in original) (quoting Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington 
Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
 45 See id. at 5 (explaining different claims for each allegation). Disparate treatment claims focus 
on the intent of the actor. Id. Disparate impact claims, however, focus on the effects of an actor’s 
facially neutral determination. Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 See Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining how direct evidence 
sufficiently demonstrates that a discriminatory intent is connected to an adverse action). For example, 
in 1995, in Kormoczy v. Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing & Urban Development ex rel. Briggs, 
an administrative law judge (ALJ) evaluated two days of testimony to determine the credibility of the 
evidence. 53 F.3d 821, 822–24 (7th Cir. 1995). The lawsuit alleged that the defendants, landlords, 
refused to rent a unit to two parents and their daughter based on their familial status. Id. The ALJ 
determined that the evidence demonstrated that both a resident and an apartment owner in the building 
stated they did not want kids in the apartment. Id. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
upheld the ALJ’s determination and concluded that the statements were direct evidence sufficient to 
establish disparate treatment under the FHA. Id. at 825. 
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to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant would have 
made the same decision regardless of the discriminatory motivation.48 The 
plaintiff will only succeed if the defendant fails to prove that the decision 
stemmed from something other than discriminatory intent.49 
Disparate treatment claims based on circumstantial or indirect evidence, 
where intentional discrimination can be inferred, follow a similar pattern of 
burden-shifting as those based on direct evidence.50 Plaintiffs can establish 
                                                                                                                           
 48 CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 6; see also Kormoczy, 53 F.3d at 824 (clarifying that after a 
plaintiff satisfies the burden of showing direct disparate treatment, the defendant’s burden is to show, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant would have made the same decision in the 
absence of the illegitimate motivation). Preponderance of the evidence is an evidentiary standard for a 
party to prove that a fact is more likely than not. Preponderance of Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Examples of direct evidence in discriminatory employment contexts include 
managers stating that they do not want white employees associating with non-white employees, a boss 
denying a promotion at a garage because “women are not mechanically inclined,” or implementing an 
avoidance policy towards an employee and then firing that employee for fear of racial discrimination 
allegations. 1 LEX K. LARSON, LARSON ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 8.07 (2d ed. 2021). 
 49 See CARPENTER, supra note 20, at 6 (explaining that defendants can prove they made their 
decisions to avoid liability under the FHA). For example, in the employment context, in 1994, in 
Troupe v. May Department Stores Co., the defendant, Lord & Taylor, fired a woman because she was 
late for work on multiple occasions due to morning sickness from pregnancy. 20 F.3d 734, 738–39 
(7th Cir. 1994). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit concluded that this did not consti-
tute discrimination based on pregnancy because the defendant would have fired a male employee had 
the male employee similarly been late to work. Id. The court compared this to racial discrimination. 
Id. The court noted that absent evidence that a company would treat a white employee differently, a 
company would not be guilty of racial discrimination if it fired a Black employee who was leaving for 
a three-month medical procedure. Id. Therefore, because the defendant would have made the decision 
despite the purported animus, it was not liable. See id. 
 50 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 804 (1973) (outlining the burden-
shifting test for a disparate treatment claim). In 1973, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the U.S. 
Supreme Court enumerated a disparate treatment test in the context of an employee who was allegedly 
fired based on his race. Id. at 792, 802, 804. McDonnell Douglas was an employment case, but courts 
have applied the same test to FHA claims. Id.; see, e.g., 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants’ Ass’n v. District 
of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 682 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (applying the McDonnell Douglas test to a case 
involving discriminatory enforcement of housing code violations); Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328 
F.3d 532, 538–41 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying the McDonnell Douglas test to a building closure case); 
Reg’l Econ. Cmty. Action Program, Inc. v. City of Middletown, 294 F.3d 35, 48–52 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(applying the McDonnell Douglas test to a planning board special permit case), superseded by statute, 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, as recognized in Jackson v. 
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 768 F. App’x 16 (2d Cir. 2019). For example, in 2006, in Sherman Avenue 
Tenants’ Ass’n v. District of Columbia, the defendants, Washington, D.C. officials, started an initiative 
to intensively enforce housing codes for the district’s buildings that violated the largest number of 
housing codes. 444 F.3d at 677. Ultimately, the final list of properties the officials designated for en-
forcement were in neighborhoods with significantly higher concentrations of Hispanic residents. Id. at 
682. The plaintiffs, the tenants of one of the listed properties, sued under the FHA and produced cir-
cumstantial evidence of disparate treatment. See id. at 683–84. First, the tenants demonstrated that the 
defendants did not use their usual tactic of avoiding building closure. Id. at 683. The plaintiffs also 
brought forward evidence that the defendants treated their building differently than non-Hispanic 
buildings in violation of similar codes. Id. at 683–84. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
held that this was enough indirect evidence for a jury to reasonably conclude that the defendants en-
gaged in discriminatory activity. Id. at 684. 
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prima facie cases by showing that: (1) they are members of a protected class; (2) 
they qualified for covered housing-related services or activities, such as obtain-
ing a mortgage; (3) defendants nevertheless denied an application for or revoked 
the use of the plaintiffs’ housing benefits; and (4) the relevant housing-related 
services or activities remained available after it was revoked or denied.51 De-
fendants can overcome a prima facie case by proving that the revocation or deni-
al furthered a legitimate and nondiscriminatory purpose.52 Finally, if the defend-
ants meet their burden, plaintiffs can still show, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the stated purpose was merely a pretext for discrimination.53 
b. Disparate Impact: Facially Neutral Decisions Resulting in 
Discriminatory Effects 
Disparate impact claims, the subject of the HUD rule, typically reflect fa-
cially neutral decisions in two different circumstances.54 In the first circum-
stance, a decision impacts one group more than another.55 For example, failing 
to build public housing in a predominantly white Philadelphia neighborhood 
impacted people of color more because almost all of the people on the waiting 
list for public housing were minorities.56 In the second circumstance, a deci-
                                                                                                                           
 51 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
 52 Id. The Supreme Court has further explained that there is a level of sufficiency required to 
justify a judgment for the defendant, which requires actual evidence, and not simply an argument. 
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56, 255 n.9 (1981). 
 53 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 804. A pretext is when a defendant lies about a justifi-
cation for taking a particular action to hide the true discriminatory purpose. Pretext (Pretextual), THE 
WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION, supra note 40; see also Forrester v. 
Rauland-Borg Corp., 453 F.3d 416, 419 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that a pretext is a “deliberate false-
hood”). 
 54 Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977); 
HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42,854, 
42,862–42,863 (Aug. 19, 2019) (codified as amended at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). Facially neutral decisions 
can cause discriminatory effects by either unfavorably affecting minorities or by continuing segrega-
tive practices. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290. 
 55 Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290. 
 56 Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1018 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff’d in part, vacated 
in part, 564 F.2d 126 (3d Cir. 1977), modified, 503 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Pa. 1980). In 1976, in Resident 
Advisory Board v. Rizzo, the plaintiffs, persons and a residential organization, demonstrated that the 
defendants, government officials in Philadelphia, cancelled a public housing project in a white neigh-
borhood. Id. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania explained this had dis-
criminatory effects because 95% of those on the waitlist were racial minorities and generally living in 
the city’s poorer neighborhoods. Id. This housing project was an opportunity for those individuals to 
move into an integrated area. Id. Cancelling the project took away an opportunity for integration. Id. 
When the burden shifted to the city to justify its actions, the city claimed that it eliminated the project 
to prevent violence. Id. at 1023. The district court was unpersuaded because threats of violence alone 
do not usurp constitutional rights. Id. Furthermore, the city’s police department testified that it was 
well-equipped to handle disturbances arising from the project. Id. at 1023–24. Because the defendant 
could not justify its actions, the court held that the plaintiffs successfully established a claim for dis-
parate impact under the FHA. Id. at 1024. 
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sion perpetuates segregation in a particular community.57 For example, a zon-
ing ordinance that restricted the development of multi-family homes in a pre-
dominantly white area effectively precluded desegregation.58 
Even before the Supreme Court addressed the issue in 2015, there was al-
so near-unanimous consent among the courts that disparate impact claims are 
cognizable, or recognized, under the FHA.59 Courts reasoned that the justicia-
bility of disparate impact claims was increasingly important because requiring 
a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent was too difficult in cases where there 
was no evidence of “overt bigotry.”60 
                                                                                                                           
 57 E.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290 (describing the types of facially neutral de-
terminations that can create disparate impacts). Richard Rothstein summarizes residential segregation: 
“We like to think of American history as a continuous march of progress toward greater freedom, 
greater equality, and greater justice. But sometimes we move backward, dramatically so. Residential 
integration declined steadily from 1880 to the mid-twentieth century, and it has mostly stalled since 
then.” ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 39. In 1917, in Buchanan v. Warley, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that a Louisville, Kentucky zoning ordinance that prevented a Black individual from purchasing a 
home from a white individual violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 245 U.S. 
60, 82 (1917). Following that case, zoning officials could no longer enact outright segregative ordi-
nances. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 1, at 48 (explaining that after Buchanan, zoning officials attempt-
ed to prevent Black individuals from purchasing homes in middle-class, white residential areas). For 
example, in 1911, St. Louis’s planning engineer, Harland Bartholomew, stated that the purpose of the 
city’s zoning laws was to prevent migration into “finer residential districts . . . by colored people.” Id. 
at 49. To avoid Buchanan, the 1919 St. Louis zoning ordinance did not refer to race. Id. Still, the ordi-
nance designated industrial development only on land that was next to areas with a significant number 
of Black residents. Id. Subsequently, the planning engineer encouraged zoning officials to deny vari-
ances so that Black individuals could not afford homes in white neighborhoods. Id. 
 58 See United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186–88 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that a 
zoning ordinance restricting multi-family developments violates the FHA). 
 59 See DAVID H. CARPENTER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44203, DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS UNDER 
THE FAIR HOUSING ACT 2 (2015), https://crsreports.com/download?hash=104b6c7a1d9fd91df4386
ebaab5fd706cd4c9176912213f9034af337690fae3d [https://perma.cc/DP2U-9VTD] (noting the near-
unanimity of circuit courts’ recognition of the cognoscibility of disparate impact claims). Cognizable 
refers to a court’s recognition of the legal significance of an action or issue, and in this example, 
means that courts recognize disparate impact as an action or issue that courts can remedy. Id.; Cog-
nizable (Cognisable), THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION, supra 
note 40. 
 60 See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d at 1290. A justiciable controversy is one that a 
court has authority to review. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937) (defining 
justiciable controversy as a concrete issue in which a court decision could grant relief). Furthermore, 
in 1977, in Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit proceeded by warning that interpreting the statute otherwise would 
run counter to congressional intent by allowing discrete systemic discrimination. 558 F.2d at 1290. 
Nevertheless, courts, like the Seventh Circuit, also understood that disparate impact claims could not 
go unfettered. See, e.g., 558 F.2d at 1290 (holding that a bright-line rule establishing liability for dis-
criminatory intent alone would not comport with congressional intent). Statistical disparity, courts 
agreed, is not enough to justify a prima facie case for discriminatory effect without a showing that a 
practice caused the disparity. CARPENTER, supra note 59, at 3. For example, the Seventh Circuit in 
Village of Arlington Heights explained that a rule punishing every instance of discriminatory effects 
would go beyond congressional intent and could lead to unintended consequences. 558 F.2d at 1290. 
The court cited to a 1970s law review article by Professor Paul Brest. Id. (citing Paul Brest, The Su-
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Although eleven U.S. circuit courts recognized FHA disparate impact 
claims by 2013, the courts initially failed to adopt a uniform standard of re-
view.61 Typically, the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second, Third, 
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits implemented a three-step burden-shifting test, 
but even among these courts, there was no uniform application of the three-
step test.62 In general, the circuit courts require the plaintiff to first make a 
prima facie showing of disparate impact.63 If the plaintiff succeeds, the de-
                                                                                                                           
preme Court 1975 Term—Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 28–29 (1976)). In Professor Brest’s article, he supported the contention that punishing every 
instance of discriminatory effects is a bad policy decision with the example of school segregation. 
Brest, supra, at 29. Schools, Professor Brest reasoned, should have the ability to rebut a presumption 
of intended segregation because there are countless determinations that go into the level of segregation 
at a school. See id. (giving examples of the types of decisions, such as locale, capacity, or reasonable 
student neighborhood policies). Professor Brest noted that the school knows the real reason for the 
segregation, not a plaintiff. Id. Additionally, he also argued that school boards should have the ability 
to reflect parents’ desires that their children not attend schools with a high proportion of minority 
children. Id. at 29–30. Professor Brest advanced his argument by stating that in the employment con-
text, per se discriminatory effects enforcement creates racial quotas that might not accurately reflect 
the talent pool. Id. at 30. This is the only support the Seventh Circuit in Village of Arlington Heights 
provided for the contention that a per se discriminatory effects rule is inadvisable. 558 F.2d at 1290. 
 61 CARPENTER, supra note 59, at 4. The D.C. Circuit assumed that disparate impact claims are 
cognizable, but it never ruled on the issue. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory 
Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (previously codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 
100). 
 62 See Affordable Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Fresno, 433 F.3d 1182, 1194–95 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(applying a burden-shifting test similar to those applied in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
disparate impact cases); Charleston Hous. Auth. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 419 F.3d 729, 740–41 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (stating that plaintiffs must demonstrate that a defendants’ actions actually or predictably 
resulted in discriminatory effects, and then noting that the defendants must show that the proposed 
action was necessary and related to the legitimate non-discriminatory policy objectives); Langlois v. 
Abington Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 43, 49–50 (1st Cir. 2000) (following other circuit courts in holding 
that discriminatory effects create a prima facie case to which a defendant must respond with a valid 
justification); Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 934, 938–39 (2d 
Cir. 1988) (stating that plaintiffs can establish a discriminatory effect by showing a disproportionate 
burden on minorities through proportional statistics, which defendants can rebut with a justification 
that the policy was legitimate and the least restrictive means), aff’d in part per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 
(1988); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 148–50 (3d Cir. 1977) (explaining that dis-
criminatory effect alone can establish a prima facie case under a burden-shifting test and that the de-
fendant’s rebuttal must be adjudicated on a case-by-case basis), modified, 503 F. Supp. 383 (E.D. Pa. 
1980); see also Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. 
Reg. at 11,462 (describing the points of departure amongst the majority of the circuit courts); cf. In-
clusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., 747 F.3d 275, 281–82 (5th Cir. 
2014) (following the HUD’s 2013 burden-shifting test where the Fifth Circuit had not previously 
settled on an appropriate standard of review), stay granted pending cert., C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 
2014 WL 2815683 (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), remand to 795 F.3d 509 
(5th Cir. 2015), remand to C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2016 WL 4494322 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016). 
Major points of departure include whether the plaintiff or defendant bears the final burden of proof. 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11,462. 
 63 Id. A plaintiff can either show disparate impact or a segregative effect. Id.; see also supra notes 
54–58 and accompanying text. 
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fendant then has to provide some justification for the discriminatory decision.64 
Courts differ on who bears the third burden.65 Most shift the burden back to the 
plaintiff who must show that there is a less restrictive method of achieving the 
defendant’s stated policy.66 The Second Circuit, on the other hand, requires the 
defendant to prove that the decision is the least restrictive method for achiev-
ing the stated justification.67 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit implemented a four-
step balancing test, holistically weighing different factors.68 The U.S Courts of 
Appeals for the Sixth and Tenth Circuits applied hybrid approaches to the bur-
den-shifting framework and the balancing test.69 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit applied a burden-shifting test depending on whether the par-
ties were public or private in nature.70 Finally, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit applied a discriminatory effects plus causation test.71 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
11,462. The general requirement is proof that there is not another less restrictive, or less discriminato-
ry, method than the practice or policy the plaintiff is challenging. Id. 
 65 Id.; see, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 939 (placing the burden on the defend-
ant to prove that the act was the least discriminatory means). 
 66 See, e.g., Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Holly, 658 F.3d 375, 
382 (3d Cir. 2011) (shifting the burden to the plaintiff to prove a less discriminatory alternative). 
 67 Id. In fact, the Second Circuit is the only court that places the third burden on the defendant. 
Compare, e.g., Mt. Holly Gardens Citizens in Action, Inc., 658 F.3d at 382 (requiring the plaintiff to 
prove there is a less discriminatory method to achieving the policy interests for a low-income commu-
nity redevelopment), and Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d 823, 834 (8th Cir. 2010) (shifting the burden 
to the plaintiff to show “a viable alternative means” (quoting Darst-Webbe Tenant Ass’n Bd. v. St. 
Louis Hous. Auth., 417 F.3d 898, 903 (8th Cir. 2005))), and Graoch Assocs. # 33, L.P. v. Louis-
ville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Hum. Rels. Comm’n, 508 F.3d 366, 374 (6th Cir. 2007) (shifting the final 
burden to the plaintiff), and Mountain Side Mobile Ests. P’ship v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Ur-
ban Dev. ex rel. VanLoozenoord, 56 F.3d 1243, 1254 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming the relevant part of 
the judicial hearing before an independent ALJ that the third burden rests with the plaintiff), with 
Huntington Branch, NAACP, 844 F.2d at 939 (placing the burden on the defendant to prove that the 
act was the least discriminatory means). 
 68 See Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) 
(presenting four balancing factors critical to demonstrating liability under an FHA disparate impact 
claim). The four-factor balancing test includes: (1) the strength of discriminatory effect, (2) the extent of 
evidence supporting the defendant’s bad intent, (3) the defendant’s interest in the practice, and (4) the 
type of relief sought by the plaintiff. Id. For the fourth factor, the court asks whether the plaintiff 
wants the defendant to affirmatively provide housing or to simply stop restricting other people’s abil-
ity to convey property. Id. 
 69 See Graoch Assocs. # 33, L.P., 508 F.3d at 374 (applying a burden-shifting test and weighing 
the statistical disparities with the defendant’s proffered interest); Reinhart v. Lincoln Cnty., 482 F.3d 
1225, 1229 (10th Cir. 2007) (adopting a hybrid approach by incorporating a three-factor balancing test 
along with the second step of the burden-shifting framework). 
 70 See CARPENTER, supra note 59, at 6 (stating that the Fourth Circuit will apply a burden-shifting 
test for private defendants, and a four-factor balancing test for public defendants). Compare Betsey v. 
Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F.2d 983, 987, 988 n.5 (4th Cir. 1984) (using a burden-shifting test for 
claims against a private entity), with Smith v. Town of Clarkton, 682 F.2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir. 1972) 
(following the balancing test articulated in Village of Arlington Heights). In 1984, Betsey v. Turtle 
Creek Associates was a case filed against a private entity. 736 F.2d at 988 n.5. In 1972, Smith v. Town 
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In 2013, to remedy the inconsistencies among the circuit courts and avoid 
subjecting parties to uncertainty regarding how the courts might evaluate con-
duct, the HUD adopted regulations that uniformly applied to all disparate im-
pact cases.72 The 2013 rule stated that disparate impact claims were cognizable 
even in cases where there was no discriminatory intent.73 Similar to prior tests, 
however, the practice would still be lawful if a defendant could sufficiently 
justify the targeted actions.74 The HUD elaborated it would judge a legitimate 
interest on a case-by-case basis against objective criteria to determine whether 
the explanation was a pretext for discrimination.75 
The HUD modeled the 2013 rule after the three-step burden-shifting test 
already implemented by a majority of the circuit courts.76 First, a plaintiff 
needed to show “that a challenged practice caused or . . . will cause a discrimi-
natory effect.”77 The defendant would then have the opportunity to prove that a 
policy is required for a nondiscriminatory, legitimate purpose.78 If the defend-
ant met this burden, the plaintiff could still succeed by showing that there was 
a less discriminatory method to achieve the defendant’s interest.79 In 2015, the 
                                                                                                                           
of Clarkton was a case filed against a public body. See id.; see also Smith, 682 F.2d at 1058–59. In 
Betsey, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reasoned that a burden-shifting test would 
have been inappropriate in Clarkton because the business necessity element would not apply to public 
bodies. Betsey, 736 F.2d at 988 n.5. The court noted that the Clarkton balancing test (i.e., the Village 
of Arlington Heights balancing test) is inapplicable because the burden-shifting framework is more 
straightforward when a private entity is the defendant. Id. Thus, the Betsey court required plaintiffs to 
show that a policy disproportionately affected the minorities in a total group, and to overcome this 
showing, the burden shifted to defendants to prove a business necessity. Id. In contrast, in Clarkton, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit balanced the following Village of Arlington Heights 
factors: (1) strength of impact, (2) bad intent, (3) the defendant’s interest, and (4) the type of relief 
sought. Id.; see also Smith, 682 F.2d at 1065. 
 71 See Hallmark Devs., Inc. v. Fulton Cnty., 466 F.3d 1276, 1286 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining 
that a plaintiff can establish disparate impact by statistical evidence demonstrating a relationship be-
tween the negative effects of a policy or decision on a group). 
 72 See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11,460, 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (previously codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (justifying the 2013 rule 
adoption to address, in part, the inconsistency in the application methodology for discriminatory ef-
fects, which left parties uncertain about how to comply with the law). 
 73 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013). 
 74 Id. Disparate impact arises when a policy “actually or predictably results in . . . discriminatory” 
effects towards a protected class. Id. § 100.500(a). Further, a defendant can justify a policy or practice 
when it is the least restrictive way to achieve a valid interest. Id. § 100.500(b). 
 75 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
11,471. The HUD declined to list examples of interests that would always be deemed per se legiti-
mate. Id. 
 76 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c) (implementing a three-step burden-shifting test). 
 77 Id. § 100.500(c)(1). 
 78 Id. § 100.500(c)(2). 
 79 Id. § 100.500(c)(3). As support that the rule was a reasonable articulation for disparate impact 
claims, the HUD 2013 rule modeled the burden-shifting approaches for bringing disparate impact 
claims off of approaches used in the employment context. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (implementing 
a burden-shifting approach for disparate impact based on Title VII employment discrimination); 29 
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U.S. Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities questioned the validity of this 
rule when it opined on potential limitations to disparate impact pleading.80 
B. Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc.’s Effect on Disparate Impact Cases 
In 2019, the HUD proposed a new rule to replace the 2013 disparate im-
pact regulation, citing the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Texas Department 
of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. as its 
primary justification.81 In Inclusive Communities, the Court held that the Inclu-
sive Communities Project (ICP), the plaintiff, must rely on something more 
than a statistical disparity to establish discriminatory effects as a prima facie 
showing of disparate impact under the FHA.82 Congress provides guidelines 
for state housing agencies, such as the Texas Department of Housing and 
Community Affairs (TDHCA), the defendant in this case, through a Qualified 
Allocation Plan (QAP).83 Through these plans, Low Income Housing Tax 
Credits (LIHTCs) are allocated to developers building low-income housing 
projects.84 Pursuant to the guidelines, the TDHCA developed a methodology to 
                                                                                                                           
C.F.R. § 1625.7 (2020) (implementing a burden-shifting approach for disparate impact based on the 
age discrimination in employment). 
 80 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (articulating claim limitations on FHA disparate impact cases), 
remand to 795 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2015), remand to C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2016 WL 4494322 (N.D. 
Tex. Aug. 26, 2016). 
 81 See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 
42,854, 42,854 (Aug. 19, 2019) (codified as amended at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (proposing a new rule to 
replace the 2013 disparate impact rule); see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522 
(discussing the limitations on FHA disparate impact claims). 
 82 135 S. Ct. at 2522. 
 83 See I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(B) (West 2020) (codified at Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2021, 
Pub. L. No. 116-260, § 201(a) 134 Stat. 1182, 3056 (2020)) (deferring to states with regards to the 
implementation of a Qualified Allocation Plan (QAP)). 
 84 See id. (defining a QAP); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2306.6701 (West 2001) (allocating over-
sight of Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTCs) to the Texas Department of Housing and Com-
munity Affairs (TDHCA)). A qualified low-income housing project is either a property with at least 
20% affordable units whose occupants have income less than or equal to 50% of the area’s median 
gross income (AMGI), or it is property with at least 40% affordable units whose occupants have in-
come less than or equal to 60% of the AMGI. I.R.C. § 42(g)(1). Congress originally adopted LIHTCs 
as part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and replaced prior incentives to invest in low-income housing 
by including more incentives for supporting lower-income households. CONG. BUDGET OFF., CBO 
STAFF MEMORANDUM: THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT 
COMPARED WITH HOUSING VOUCHERS 1 (1992), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/102nd-
congress-1991-1992/reports/doc09b.pdf [https://perma.cc/984X-FY8F]. The purpose of LIHTCs is to 
address the lowered quality and quantity of affordable housing for impoverished individuals. Id. at 2. 
The Internal Revenue Code sets forth a QAP that outlines principles that a housing credit agency must 
use when determining housing priorities, including giving preference to projects that are long-term 
and located in qualified census tracts. I.R.C. § 42(m)(1)(B). 
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assign a value and rank to applications it received.85 The TDHCA readily ad-
mitted that it allocated discretionary points to criteria outside the relevant QAP 
statute.86 The ICP alleged that the TDHCA used race and ethnicity as factors to 
allocate LIHTCs that subjected minority tenants “to severe conditions of slum 
and blight” conditions.87 Following disagreements with the lower courts and 
                                                                                                                           
 85 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 2306.6710(b)(1). The ranking system, in order, prioritizes ten crite-
ria: (1) the affordability of the development, (2) the community support on a resolution for the devel-
opment, (3) the tenant income bases, (4) the dimensions and caliber of the units, (5) the rent rates of 
the units, (6) the cost of the development, (7) the amenities, (8) the development’s location, (9) the 
level of neighborhood support, and (10) the level of support from the district representative. Id. 
 86 See Op. Tex. Att’y Gen. No. GA-0208, at 1, 8 (2004) (citing to a TDHCA brief that allocates 
points outside the scope of the Texas QAP). The Texas Attorney General, Greg Abbott, concluded 
that the TDHCA acted outside its authority by allocating higher points to factors outside the ten crite-
ria in the QAP. Id. at 10. The Attorney General reasoned that the TDHCA’s discretionary allocation 
was inconsistent with the express language of the Tax Reform Act and the QAP because it gave crite-
ria outside the statute higher weight than the ten factors in the QAP. Id. at 16. 
 87 Complaint at 5, 10, Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., C.A. 
No. 08-cv-00546, 2008 WL 5191935 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2008). The Inclusive Communities Project 
(ICP), the plaintiff, is a non-profit organization that works with low-income families to obtain housing 
in non-minority areas of Dallas, Texas. Id. at 3. The ICP works closely with Black families to partici-
pate in the Dallas Housing Authority’s Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. Id. The HUD 
issues funds to local public housing authorities (PHAs) to administer housing choice vouchers to low-
income families. Housing Choice Vouchers Fact Sheet, HUD.GOV, https://www.hud.gov/topics/
housing_choice_voucher_program_section_8 [https://perma. cc/zh6g-A7AR]. Eligible families can 
then find owners who accept the housing vouchers. Id. In turn, the PHAs subsidize a certain amount 
of the rent, and the families pay the remaining rent owed. Id. In 2010, in Inclusive Communities, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas considered cross motions for summary judgment 
on the ICP’s allegations that the TDHCA, the defendant, discriminatorily allocated its LIHTCs. Inclu-
sive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d 486, 490 (N.D. Tex. 2010), ordered findings of fact and 
conclusion law, ordered remedial efforts, 860 F. Supp. 2d 312 (N.D. Tex. 2012), and motion for at-
torney’s fees and costs granted, C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2013 WL 598390 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 15, 2013), 
rev’d, remanded by 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), stay granted pending cert., C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 
2014 WL 2815683 (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), remand to 795 F.3d 509 
(5th Cir. 2015), remand to C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2016 WL 4494322 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016). 
The lower court ruled in favor of the ICP and recognized its disparate impact claims. Id. at 500. The 
ICP made two alternative substantive claims: (1) the TDHCA intentionally discriminated based on 
race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Civil Rights Act; 
and (2) the TDHCA’s LIHTCs allocation had discriminatory effects in violation of the FHA. Inclusive 
Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., 860 F. Supp. 2d 312, 313–14 (N.D. Tex. 
2012), motion for attorney’s fees and costs granted, C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2013 WL 598390 (N.D. 
Tex. Feb. 15, 2013), rev’d, remanded by 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), stay granted pending cert., 
C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2014 WL 2815683 (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), 
remand to 795 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2015), remand to C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2016 WL 4494322 (N.D. 
Tex. Aug. 26, 2016). Moreover, the ICP stated that TDHCA disproportionately approved tax credits 
for non-elderly units in areas with minimal representation. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 749 
F. Supp. 2d at 499. Specifically, the ICP argued that “from 1999–2008, [the] TDHCA approved tax 
credits for 49.7% of proposed non-elderly units in 0% to 9.9% Caucasian areas, . . . only approved 
37.4% of proposed non-elderly units in 90% to 100% Caucasian areas, . . . [and] . . . 92.29% of 
LIHTC units in the city of Dallas were located in census tracts with less than 50% Caucasian resi-
dents.” Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d at 331. As a 
remedy, the district court required the TDHCA to propose new selection criteria for tax credits that 
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the promulgation of the 2013 FHA disparate impact rule, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari.88 
                                                                                                                           
comply with the FHA. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d at 332. The court also encour-
aged the ICP and the TDHCA to collaborate to reduce the possibility of future complaints. Id. Finally, 
the court awarded the ICP attorney’s fees and costs of $1,893,969. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. 
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2013 WL 598390, at *1, *7 (N.D. Tex. 
Feb. 15, 2013), rev’d, remanded by 747 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2014), stay granted pending cert., C.A. No. 
08-CV-00546, 2014 WL 2815683 (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), remand to 
795 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2015), remand to C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2016 WL 4494322 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 
26, 2016). In 2010, the Texas district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the ICP’s 
prima facie case for a disparate impact claim. See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 749 F. Supp. 2d at 
499–500. The court relied heavily on statistical disparities to support the prima facie case. Id. In 2012, 
after a four-day bench trial and written closing arguments, the district court ruled that TDHCA failed 
to meet its burden of proving that there was no alternative to the LIHTCs allocation system that would 
address the department’s interests in a less discriminatory manner. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 860 
F. Supp. 2d at 331; Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 8, Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 
(No. 13-1371). The court concluded with respect to the disparate treatment claim, however, that the 
ICP failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the TDHCA intentionally violated the 
Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights Act. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 860 F. Supp. 2d at 
319–21, 319 n.10. The ICP alleged disparate treatment based on indirect evidence that the TDHCA’s 
justifications were pretextual. Id. at 319. First, the court found that TDHCA did not intentionally dis-
criminate in LIHTCs allocation because the department produced evidence that the QAP complied 
with applicable laws and that the staff ranked the applications according to the QAP. Id. The TDHCA 
also offered witness testimony supporting no intentional discrimination. Id. Second, the ICP could not 
prove that the TDHCA used its discretion discriminatorily because the TDHCA was able to credibly 
justify its discretionary approvals and rejections. Id. In one instance, for example, the TDHCA reject-
ed an application because the project was for three-bedroom units only, and the TDHCA preferred 
projects to have units of different sizes. Id. Third, the ICP could not prove that the TDHCA intention-
ally tried to create discriminatory effects because the TDHCA produced evidence that it affirmatively 
tried to do the opposite. Id. at 320. Fourth, the ICP could not prove the TDHCA’s underwriting prac-
tices were discriminatory because the TDHCA had an interest in the financial feasibility of a project. 
Id. at 320–21. Lastly, the court pointed to examples demonstrating that the TDHCA’s justifications 
were not pretextual. Id. The court reiterated that the TDHCA had a legitimate interest in the financial 
feasibility of projects and in approving projects with less turnover, even if that meant approving elder-
ly projects that typically have fewer minority residents. Id. at 320–21. Thus, the Texas court conclud-
ed that the ICP was not able to show disparate treatment. Id. 
 88 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., C.A. No. 08-CV-
00546, 2014 WL 2815683, at *1 (N.D. Tex. June 23, 2014) (reviewing the TDHCA’s motion to stay 
pending the results of the petition to the Supreme Court), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), remand to 795 
F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2015), remand to C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2016 WL 4494322 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 
2016). After the district court ruled in favor of the ICP, the TDHCA appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 
Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs, 747 F.3d 275, 280 (5th Cir. 
2014), stay granted pending cert., C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2014 WL 2815683 (N.D. Tex. June 23, 
2014), aff’d, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015), remand to 795 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2015), remand to C.A. No. 08-
CV-00546, 2016 WL 4494322 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit only addressed whether the Texas district court ruled correctly in finding for the ICP on its 
FHA disparate impact allegations. Id. During the appeal, the HUD proposed the 2013 regulations to 
standardize burdens of proof in disparate impact cases. See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013) (codifying the 
proposed 2013 regulation). The Fifth Circuit reiterated that disparate impact claims are cognizable, 
but it remanded the proceedings to the Northern District Court of Texas to implement the standards 
outlined in the 2013 HUD proposed regulations. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 747 F.3d at 280–83. 
The TDHCA, the defendants, in turn, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for certiorari. Inclusive 
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The Court’s opinion in Inclusive Communities was the dominant influ-
ence for the 2019 FHA disparate impact rule proposed by the HUD.89 The 
Court grounded its decision in two prior cases, both analyzing two allegations 
of employment discrimination under two similar statutes: Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 and the Age Discrimination Employment Act (ADEA).90 
To begin, the Court looked to Griggs v. Duke Power Co., and its interpre-
tation of Title VII.91 In 1971, in Griggs, the Supreme Court analyzed the dis-
criminatory effect of a general education test and a high school diploma re-
quirement as prerequisites for employment in the defendant’s, Duke Power 
Company, labor and operations departments.92 Undeniably, white employees 
fared better under those requirements than did Black employees.93 Neverthe-
less, the Court did not view either requirement as substantially related to the 
skills required to perform the relevant job.94 The Court held that, even though 
there was no discriminatory purpose, Title VII must allow for disparate impact 
claims in fulfillment of the statute’s purpose—removing “artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary” restrictions on employment when those restrictions result in 
discrimination on a protected class.95 
                                                                                                                           
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 2014 WL 2815683, at *1. They asked the Supreme Court to address two issues: 
(1) the cognoscibility of the FHA disparate impact claims, and (2) the applicable standards. Id. at *2. 
On October 2, 2014 the Supreme Court granted certiorari, heard oral arguments on January 21, 2015, 
and issued its ruling on June 25, 2015. See generally Court Docket, Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. 2507 (No. 13-1371). The Court granted certiorari to answer only the question of “whether dis-
parate-impact claims are cognizable under the Fair Housing Act.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 
S. Ct. at 2515. 
 89 See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 
42,854, 42,854 (Aug. 19, 2019) (codified as amended at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (relying on Inclusive 
Communities as justification for proposing the new rule). 
 90 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2516–19; see also Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 
U.S. 228, 240 (2005) (plurality opinion) (expanding disparate impact liability to Section 4(a) of the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
436 (1971) (expanding disparate impact liability to § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964). Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate based on race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The statute prohibits employers from discriminatorily 
firing, refusing to hire, or compensating, or otherwise discriminating in employment terms. Id. The 
statute also prohibits segregating employees in a way that restricts opportunities. Id. Similarly, the 
ADEA prohibits employment discrimination based on age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). The statute includes 
restrictions similar to those found in Title VII, but it instead refers to discrimination based on the 
employee’s age. See id. The ADEA includes a provision that prohibits employers from reducing com-
pensation to comply with the law. Id. 
 91 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2516; see Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436 (expanding dis-
parate impact claims to employment discrimination cases). 
 92 401 U.S. at 425–27. 
 93 Id. at 430. North Carolina census information showed that white individuals were nearly three 
times more likely than Black individuals to obtain high school diplomas. Id. at 430 n.6. 
 94 Id. at 431. 
 95 Id. at 431–32, 436 (allowing disparate impact claims for Title VII employment discrimination 
unless the defendant can prove the hiring criteria had some “business necessity” with a “manifest 
relationship” to job performance). Griggs v. Duke Power Co. was a landmark 1971 U.S. Supreme 
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Next, the Court looked to its 2005 decision in Smith v. City of Jackson, 
and its interpretation of the ADEA.96 In Smith, the Court used the reasoning of 
Griggs in the context of employment discrimination based on age.97 The de-
fendant, the City of Jackson, had a policy that gave younger police officers 
more generous raises.98 This disproportionately affected officers over the age 
of forty.99 Although the Court held that disparate impact cases are cognizable 
under the ADEA in certain circumstances, the Court concluded that the de-
fendants proffered a reasonable business necessity—competitive salaries to 
reduce turnover—for their policy.100 
In Inclusive Communities, the Court emphasized the comprehensive lan-
guage in both Title VII and the ADEA that allowed for disparate impact 
claims.101 Instead of concentrating on the employer’s motivations, the Court 
concluded that the “otherwise adversely affect[s an employee’s] status” lan-
guage required the Court to focus on the effects of an employer’s actions.102 
By viewing Smith and Griggs in tandem, the Court reasoned that anti-discrim-
ination laws containing language focusing on the adverse consequences of a 
given action should be construed to allow for disparate impact claims.103 Thus, 
because the FHA makes it unlawful to discriminate in housing “or otherwise 
make unavailable” housing for discriminatory purposes, the Court held that 
disparate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA.104 
                                                                                                                           
Court case, and in the years that followed, it provoked scrutiny of employers potentially over screen-
ing employees. Mark S. Brodin, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s 1988 Term: The Employment 
Discrimination Decisions and the Abandonment of the Second Reconstruction, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1, 5–6 
(1989). Federal courts examined facially neutral policies, such as requirements for height and weight, 
examination scores, experience, and familial relationships. Id. The courts concluded that although 
some of these requirements might have appeared to be useful, many were not actually helpful in de-
termining the applicant’s ability to perform the job. Id. 
 96 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2517; see Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 
240 (2005) (plurality opinion) (expanding disparate impact liability to age discrimination claims). 
 97 See Smith, 544 U.S. at 235–36 (drawing parallels with Griggs as “prohibit[ing] such actions 
that ‘deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect [their] status as 
an employee, because of such individual’s’ race or age” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000)). 
 98 Id. at 231. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 243. In 2005, in Smith v. City of Jackson, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the defend-
ant’s, the City of Jackson, decision to increase low-ranking employee raises was reasonable because it 
was consistent with the legitimate interest of adjusting to reflect peer police force salaries to reduce 
employee turnover. Id. at 242. 
 101 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(2); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2); Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 
2517–18. 
 102 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2518 (quoting Smith, 544 U.S. at 235) (high-
lighting the “otherwise” language in Title VII and the ADEA, which focuses on effects, not motiva-
tions). 
 103 Id. 
 104 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added); see Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2518 
(highlighting the effects language in the FHA). The focus is on the use of “otherwise make unavaila-
ble,” which like Title VII and the ADEA, creates a result-oriented focus rather than one that considers 
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The holding in Inclusive Communities came with caveats expressed in 
dicta.105 The primary purpose of disparate impact liability is to eliminate the 
“artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers,” without hindering legitimate 
interests.106 According to the Court, to achieve this purpose, disparate impact 
liability should, first, be limited to allow some leeway for valid interests served 
by the policy in question.107 Second, disparate impact claims should also per-
mit defendants to consider relevant market factors.108 Finally, absent “robust 
causality” with a specific policy, statistical disparities alone will not support a 
claim for disparate impact under the FHA.109 
                                                                                                                           
motivation. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2518–19 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2012)). 
In 2015, in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. 
the U.S. Supreme Court provided three other grounds to support its holding. Id. at 2520–22. First, 
according to the Court, the 1988 amendments to the statute would be superfluous if they assumed 
liability was constrained to disparate treatment. Id. at 2520–21. Second, similar to the ADEA’s rea-
sonable-factor-other-than-age (RFOA) provision precluding liability for reasonable non-age distinc-
tions (which the Smith Court reasoned would be useless if liability was limited to disparate treatment), 
the FHA provides for an appraisal exemption in § 3605(a), which can consider factors other than those 
protected. Id. at 2521; see Smith, 544 U.S. at 239 (stating that the RFOA has the function of “preclud-
ing liability if the adverse impact was attributable to a non-age factor that was ‘reasonable’”). Third, 
the stated purpose of the FHA, to eliminate discrimination in the housing market, generally supports 
disparate impact liability. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2521–22. 
 105 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522 (stating that disparate impact has been 
limited to avoid interplay with constitutional dilemmas). For example, the Court explained, allowing 
disparate impact liability through statistical analysis alone would run counter to the U.S. Constitution. 
Id. Liability under this type of regime, the Court noted, might hinder legitimate government interests. 
Id. 
 106 Id. (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). The Court noted that the 
purpose of the FHA is to promote legitimate interests but not at the expense of creating discriminatory 
effects or reinforcing segregation. Id. 
 107 Id. The Court compared the defendants’, the TDHCA and its officers, latitude for legitimate 
interests with employment discrimination cases that allowed for similar necessity defenses. Id. In the 
employment context, courts could only impose liability where a discriminatory policy was not unre-
lated to employment skills and unnecessary for the company. Id. 
 108 Id. In the present case, the Court gave the example that organizations, like the TDHCA, are 
trying to help the housing market, and these organizations should not bear the burden of high-cost 
alternative priorities. Id. Additionally, the Court signaled that zoning officials also must take other 
pecuniary and community factors into consideration, such as traffic or historical preservation. Id. The 
FHA, the Court explained, does not impose its own vision of housing development. Id. 
 109 Id. The Court loosely suggested that a plaintiff can meet the “robust causality requirement” by 
showing that a policy or procedure caused a disparity. See id. (holding statistical disparities, without 
more, do not establish prima facie cases for disparate treatment). The purpose of this requirement, the 
Court stated, is to not hold defendants accountable for discriminatory effects they did not perpetuate. 
Id. In addition, the Court feared that disparate impact claims could lead organizations to use “numeri-
cal quotas,” which would bring a host of constitutional issues. Id. (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co. 
v. Atonio, 493 U.S. 642, 653 (1989), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k), as recognized in 
Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015)). 
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1. Remaining Questions After Inclusive Communities 
Although the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities was clear that dis-
parate impact claims are cognizable under the FHA, it left open several ambi-
guities for lower courts to interpret.110 First, it was unclear whether the 2013 
HUD disparate impact rule would survive given the new claim limitations.111 
Second, the Court heightened a plaintiff’s burdens with the claim limitations, 
without expressly defining terminology such as “robust causality” or whether 
“arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary” is an element of the pleading.112 
On remand from the Supreme Court, the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas applied a framework in line with the Court’s deci-
sion and attempted to answer a number of the looming questions.113 Ultimate-
ly, the district court dismissed ICP’s disparate impact claims for failure to al-
lege a prima facie case.114 Importantly, though, the court applied the 2013 
HUD burden-shifting regime, which it determined remained intact after the 
Supreme Court decision, but modified its approach by implementing its inter-
pretation of the Court’s limitations.115 
In its articulation of the modified disparate impact framework, the North-
ern District of Texas stated that a plaintiff must highlight specific policies 
                                                                                                                           
 110 Id. (leaving questions for lower courts to decide). The Supreme Court in Inclusive Communi-
ties left open the following issues for the lowers court to answer: (1) the type of defendant justifica-
tions that Inclusive Communities allows, (2) the Court’s constitutional interpretative effect on other 
disparate impact regulations, (3) lower courts’ interpretation of the robust causality standard, and (4) 
the qualifications to subject a policy to scrutiny. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disparate Impact and the 
Role of Classification and Motivation in Equal Protection Law After Inclusive Communities, 101 
CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1131–32, 1140 (2016); Claire Williams, Note, Inclusive Communities and 
Robust Causality: The Constant Struggle to Balance Access to the Courts with Protection for Defend-
ants, 102 MINN. L. REV. 969, 989 (2017). 
 111 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522 (articulating potential variances from the 
2013 HUD rule). Claim limitations potentially include identifying “artificial, arbitrary, and unneces-
sary” barriers, allowing leeway for legitimate interests, consideration of market factors, and the re-
quirement to prove a “robust causality” between the policy and the disparity. See supra notes 105–109 
and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court’s caveats to recognizing disparate impact lia-
bility under the FHA). 
 112 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424, 431 (1971)) (remaining silent on potential new requirements). 
 113 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs., C.A. No. 08-CV-
00546, 2016 WL 4494322, at *4–6 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016) (applying the Supreme Court’s holding 
to the TDHCA’s allocation of LIHTCs). 
 114 Id. at *13. 
 115 Id. at *4–6. Because the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities did not expressly reject the 
burden-shifting approach that the Fifth Circuit adopted, in 2016 on remand, the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Texas interpreted this as leaving the 2013 regulation intact. See id. (applying 
the three-part burden-shifting approach alongside limitations the Supreme Court identified). Under the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision adopting the HUD regulations, the plaintiff must first show that a policy caus-
es discriminatory effects. Id. If the plaintiff is successful, the defendant must proffer a legitimate non-
discriminatory interest. Id. Finally, if the court deems the defendant’s interest legitimate, a plaintiff 
can still show that there is a less restrictive way of achieving that interest. Id. 
1342 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1321 
causing statistical disparities to meet the requisite burden of proof.116 Policies, 
the court elaborated, are not one-time decisions, and “robust causality” re-
quires more than just statistical disparity between the policy and disparate im-
pact.117 Additionally, as the Supreme Court noted, robust causality may be too 
difficult to prove because multiple factors go into complex decisions, including 
LIHTCs.118 In summation, the Texas district court understood that an inquiry 
into a disparate impact allegations requires careful analysis.119 The court held 
that the ICP did not successfully plead a prima facie case because it did not 
identify and plausibly demonstrate that a facially neutral policy or procedure 
caused statistically significant disparate effects.120 Other lower courts, howev-
er, have interpreted the Inclusive Communities decision less restrictively while 
still complying with its spirit.121 
                                                                                                                           
 116 Id. at *4–5. The Texas district court stated that it is not enough for the plaintiff to simply argue 
that a “generalized policy” causes discriminatory effects. Id. at *6. The requirement that a plaintiff 
point to a specific policy, the court elaborated, is necessary because it helps the court determine 
whether the specific policy actually caused the discriminatory effects. Id. The court concluded that the 
TDHCA’s policy of discretionarily apportioning LIHTCs was a generalized policy, and not a specific 
one. Id. 
 117 Id. at *4–5 (quoting Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2523). The court noted that 
the ICP failed to prove that the discretionary allocation caused the discriminatory effects. Id. at *8–9. 
First, the ICP did not prove what the allocation would be if the TDHCA did not use discretionary 
authority. Id. Second, the ICP did not consider other confounding variables as causes for the dispari-
ties. Id. Other factors such as “zoning rules, community preferences, or developers’ choices,” the 
court noted, may have caused the discriminatory effects. Id. at *9. Moreover, the ICP was misguided 
by attempting to link cumulative statistics to individual cases. Id. 
 118 Id. at *4–5. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at *7–8. With respect to the 9% LIHTCs, the court further reasoned that the ICP was, in 
fact, arguing for disparate treatment and not disparate impact when it pointed to discretion as the 
cause for racial disparity. Id. at *8. Even if this argument was for disparate impact, the court conclud-
ed that the ICP still failed to plausibly demonstrate that the discretion caused a statistically significant 
disparity. Id. For similar reasons, the court also concluded that the ICP failed to satisfy the “robust 
causality” requirement with respect to 4% LIHTCs. Id. at *12–13. 
 121 See, e.g., Cnty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2018) 
(denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss in part and allowing the plaintiff to move forward with its 
FHA claims). In 2018, in County of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., the U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois held that the plaintiff, County of Cook, plausibly alleged a claim for disparate 
impact under the FHA and denied the defendants’, Wells Fargo & Co. and related organizations, mo-
tion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Id. at 993–94, 999. First, the plaintiff identified statistical 
disparities. Id. at 992. Second, the plaintiff pointed to a specific policy that it claimed attributed to the 
statistical disparity. Id. at 992–93. The plaintiff used a percentage analysis to show that the defendants 
issued a disproportionate amount of subprime loans to minority borrowers. Id. Specifically, the plain-
tiff alleged that the defendants relied primarily on employee discretion that resulted in equity stripping 
practices. Id. Third, the plaintiff claimed that the required causal relationship between the practice and 
discriminatory effects existed. Id. at 994. The court concluded that the plaintiff “satisfied the robust 
causation requirement” simply by alleging that the denial of loan modifications pushed borrowers into 
foreclosure. Id. This interpretation was consistent with the interpretations of the Eight, Ninth, and 
D.C. Circuits. Id. at 991–93 (first citing Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1107–08 (8th 
Cir. 2017); then citing City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., 691 F. App’x 453, 454 (9th Cir. 
2021] The Future of Disparate Impact Liability 1343 
C. The HUD’s Implementation of the FHA’s Disparate Impact  
Standard as Influenced by Inclusive Communities 
In a purported second effort to clarify ambiguities from the Supreme 
Court’s 2015 decision in Inclusive Communities, on August 19, 2019, the HUD 
proposed a rule for implementation of the FHA’s disparate impact standard.122 
It justified the disparate impact rule changes, in part, as an incorporation of 
Inclusive Communities.123 In response to comments received on June 20, 2018, 
                                                                                                                           
2017); then citing City of Los Angeles v. Bank of Am. Corp., 691 F. App’x 464, 465 (9th Cir. 2017); 
and then citing Boykin v. Fenty, 650 F. App’x 42, 42–43 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam)). None of the 
cases resulted in positive outcomes for the plaintiffs, showing the dangers of interpreting the prece-
dent too strictly. See infra Appendix. Moreover, the Illinois district court used lenient interpretations 
of the standards when assessing facts supporting plausible allegations and the meaning of “robust 
causation.” See Cnty. of Cook, 314 F. Supp. 3d at 993–94 (discussing the narrative of the plaintiff’s 
complaint). The court also largely ignored the “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary” element as a 
concession by the defendants. Id. at 992–93 (quoting Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 
2524). Although the elements may still seem stringent, the County of Cook court balanced the interest 
of allowing a plaintiff to proceed with discovery and the dangers of undermining valid business inter-
ests. See id. at 998–99 (allowing a plaintiff to move beyond the pleading stage).  
 122 HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 
42,854, 42,864 (Aug. 19, 2019) (codified as amended at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 123 HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 
42,857; see Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522 (articulating claim limitations on FHA 
disparate impact cases). On May 15, 2017, the HUD issued a Federal Register notice seeking public 
input to identify any ineffective regulations. Reducing Regulatory Burden: Enforcing the Regulatory 
Reform Agenda Under Executive Order 13777, 82 Fed. Reg. 22,344, 22,345 (May 15, 2017). The 
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) guides the rulemaking process. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559; MAEVE P. 
CAREY, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF10003, AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS AND THE RULE-
MAKING PROCESS 1 (2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10003 [https://web.
archive.org/web/20210206211616/https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10003]. The APA 
requires that an agency notify the public of a proposed rule, and then it must accept comments from 
the public. CAREY, supra, at 1–2. After the comment period ends, typically thirty days, the agency 
must then review and respond to comments. Id. Before finalizing the rule, the agency must submit the 
proposed rule to the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Af-
fairs for economic and policy review. Id. Finally, the agency may promulgate the rule, briefly stating 
the purpose for the regulation. Id. Because Congress delegated to the agency rulemaking powers, the 
legislature can still exercise control over regulations in three ways. Id. First, Congress can overturn 
rules by passing legislation or using the Congressional Review Act to issue a joint resolution. Id. Sec-
ond, Congress can use its power of oversight to realign agency objectives. Id. Third, Congress can use 
the power of the purse to control the effectiveness of regulations. Id. Courts can also overturn an 
agency rule if the agency acted arbitrarily and capriciously, exceeded statutory authority, violated the 
Constitution, or did not follow required procedures for enacting a regulation, including those men-
tioned. Id. For all intents and purposes, however, regulations carry the same weight as statutes because 
agencies have broad discretion. See Nat’l Latino Media Coal. v. FCC, 816 F.2d 785, 788 (D.C. Cir. 
1987) (contrasting legislative rules with interpretive rules, and holding that legislative rules carry the 
full force of law). After the HUD issued notice in 2016, on October 26, 2017, the Secretary of the 
Treasury suggested that the agency reconsider the disparate impact rule’s impact insurance provision. 
STEVEN T. MNUCHIN & CRAIG S. PHILLIPS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT 
CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: ASSET MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 110 (2017), https://
www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A-Financial-System-That-Creates-Economic-
Opportunities-Asset_Management-Insurance.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20210301070405/
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the HUD published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPR) to so-
licit suggestions on the disparate impact rule.124 
According to the HUD, commenters on the ANPR generally fell into two 
categories concerning the federal standard.125 One group believed that Inclu-
sive Communities was consistent with the current rule—citing courts’ use of 
both the 2013 HUD rule and Supreme Court guidance as evidence that the two 
can coexist.126 Others thought that the current rule was inconsistent with the 
Inclusive Communities precedent and criticized the proof, causality, statistical 
disparities, and least restrictive practice standards.127 In light of this feedback, 
the HUD proposed a new rule to replace the discriminatory effects standard 
along with several minor amendments to align with the Inclusive Communities 
decision.128 
Just as in the original rule, the proposed rule maintains the notion that 
discriminatory effects against a protected class are sufficient for liability under 
the FHA.129 The first paragraph provides new guidelines to establish a prima 
facie case for discriminatory effects.130 Under the proposed rule, plaintiffs 
would have to plead facts that plausibly allege that a specific policy or practice 
has discriminatory effects by asserting that: (1) the policy or practice is “arbi-
trary, artificial, and unnecessary to achieve a valid interest or legitimate objec-
tive”; (2) there is a “robust causal link” between the policy or practice and dis-
parate impact that shows the policy or practice “direct[ly] cause[d] . . . the dis-
criminatory effect”; (3) the disparity has an adverse effect on a protected class; 
(4) the disparity is significant; and (5) there is a direct link between the dispar-
ate impact and the plaintiff’s injury.131 
                                                                                                                           
https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/A-Financial-System-That-Creates-
Economic-Opportunities-Asset_Management-Insurance.pdf]. This Note does not analyze the insur-
ance provision of the proposed regulation, but the Secretary of the Treasury requested that the HUD 
consider whether the rule complies with existing law, whether the rule might have adverse effects on 
the homeowner insurance market, and whether the rule is consistent with insurance principles. See id. 
(requesting review of the insurance provisions).  
 124 Reconsideration of HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Stand-
ard, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,560, 28,560 (June 20, 2018). The HUD received 1,923 comments. HUD’s Im-
plementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,856. 
 125 See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. 
Reg. at 42,856 (summarizing the comments on the advance notice of proposed rulemaking). 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. Other categories of criticisms included the economic burdens of the standard and prefer-
ences for state law or federal law. Id. at 42,856–42,857. 
 128 Id. at 42,854. 
 129 Id. at 42,862. 
 130 Id. The HUD states that plaintiffs must point to a specific policy, which does not include a 
“program as a whole” or a one-time housing decision. Id. at 42,858. 
 131 Id. at 42,858, 42,862 (emphasis omitted). 
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If the plaintiff satisfies this prima facie burden, a defendant can rebut the 
allegations with three arguments.132 First, a defendant can argue that its “dis-
cretion is materially limited by a third party,” such as an applicable law or a 
binding court or administrative ruling.133 Second, a defendant can attack as-
sumptions underlying a plaintiff’s allegations regarding models or algorithms 
that cause discriminatory effects.134 Finally, a defendant can show that the 
plaintiff failed to present enough facts to sustain a prima facie case.135 If the 
defendant fails to discredit a plaintiff’s prima facie case of discriminatory ef-
fect, the case will move beyond the pleading stage.136 
Once the allegations move past the pleading stage, the plaintiff must then 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, four of the prima facie elements—
robust causality, adverse effects, significant disparity, and a direct link to inju-
ry—showing that a policy or practice has discriminatory effects.137 The de-
fendant has one last opportunity to either prove any of the previously men-
tioned affirmative defenses—limited discretion, incorrect assumptions, and 
insufficient facts—by showing that the plaintiff did not satisfy the burden, or 
showing that the plaintiff’s proposed less restrictive policy did not capture a 
valid interest.138 If the defendant cannot meet this burden, the plaintiff has suc-
cessfully pleaded a disparate impact claim.139 
The proposed rule was met with widespread criticism, including from the 
institutions that would benefit most from the rule change.140 Finally, on Octo-
                                                                                                                           
 132 Id. at 42,859. 
 133 Id. Examples of a third party materially limiting the defendant’s discretion include laws (e.g., 
federal, state, and local) and binding requirements (e.g., court, arbitral, regulatory, or administrative 
requirements and orders). Id. If the government actor who imposed the limitations is the defendant, 
the HUD explains that the party cannot claim material limitation as a defense. Id. 
 134 Id. at 42,862. A defendant can provide inputs in models that prove that the defendant does not 
rely on factors that are proxies for a protected class. Id. Alternatively, a defendant can prove that the 
model is distributed by a recognized third party who determines industry standards. Id. Finally, a 
defendant can show that the model is reviewed and validated to ensure that the factors are not proxies 
for a protected class. Id. 
 135 Id. at 42,862–42,863. The HUD does not elaborate on this defense; rather, it simply states that 
a defendant can claim that the plaintiff did not meet the initial burden. Id. at 42,860. 
 136 Id. at 42,862–42,863. 
 137 Id. A plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) there is a “robust causal 
link” between the policy or practice and disparate impact that shows the policy or practice “direct[ly] 
caus[ed] the discriminatory effect”; (2) the disparity has an adverse effect on a protected class; (3) the 
disparity is significant; and (4) there is a direct link between the disparate impact and the plaintiff’s 
injury. Id. 
 138 Id. at 42,863. The proposed regulation provides defenses for material limitations in discretion 
and an attack on a plaintiff’s assumptions about models and algorithms. Id. at 42,862. 
 139 See id. at 42,862–42,863. 
 140 Emily Flitter, Big Banks’ ‘Revolutionary’ Request: Please Don’t Weaken This Rule, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/business/banks-housing-racial-discrimination.
html?campaign_id=4&emc=edit_dk_20200717&instance_id=20395&nl=dealbook&regi_id=9578
1578&segment_id=33642&te=1&user_id=cb0871435994afd0efd517593254549d [https://perma.cc/
FA5L-BJSR]. Corporate officers from Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, and Wells 
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ber 26, 2020, the HUD made a modified version of the proposed rule effec-
tive.141 First, at the pleading stage, instead of requiring plausible allegations of 
the five elements, plaintiffs must sufficiently plead facts that support the simi-
lar five elements.142 The final rule also eliminates the incorrect assumptions 
defense in the proposed rule but maintains the third party limited discretion 
defense both during and after the pleading stage.143 Moreover, the final rule 
provides defendants with a new defense.144 Now, a defendant may claim that 
the implemented policy was to forecast an event, so long as it does not dis-
criminatorily affect the plaintiffs more than non-protected individuals.145 No-
tably, the forecasted event must not discriminatorily affect the plaintiffs more 
than similarly situated non-protected individuals.146 Finally, the HUD effec-
tively limited remedies to non-monetary equitable reforms.147 The HUD will 
                                                                                                                           
Fargo vehemently objected to the proposed rule. Id. Some called this objection “unprecedented” and 
“revolutionary.” The HUD was seemingly unphased. See id. (failing to respond to a JP Morgan Chase 
letter, and responding apathetically to the Bank of America letter). In response, the HUD’s deputy 
secretary simply stated that Bank of America missed the public comment period, and the agency sug-
gested that the bank increase its own efforts. Id. 
 141 Rulemaking Docket: FR-6111-P-02 HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Dispar-
ate Impact Standard: Unified Agenda, REGULATIONS.GOV, https://beta.regulations.gov/docket/HUD-
2019-0067/unified-agenda [https://perma.cc/4CP3-RWUS]. The HUD issued the initial final action on 
September 24, 2020. Id. The final rule is published in Title 24 of the Code of Federal Regulations as 
of April 2021. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2021). 
 142 Compare 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b) (requiring the plaintiff to “sufficiently plead facts” alleging 
the five required elements of disparate impact), with HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,862 (stating that the plaintiff “must state facts plausibly 
alleging” the five required elements of disparate impact). The first element mandates that the plaintiff 
plausibly plead facts that a policy does not advance a legitimate interest. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b). 
Next, the plaintiff must state how the statistical disparities, if any, show that the policy is the appro-
priate cause of such disparity. Id. Third, the plaintiff must establish that the policy harms a protected 
class, not just an individual member of the protected class. Id. Fourth, the plaintiff must plead that the 
discriminatory effects are significant. Id. Finally, the plaintiff must demonstrate proximate cause. See 
id. (requiring a “direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged”). Prox-
imate cause is commonly defined as the legal cause, or a “sufficient” cause among other causes to 
impose liability. Proximate Cause (Direct Cause or Efficient Cause or Jural Cause or Legal Cause), 
THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY DESK EDITION, supra note 40. 
 143 Compare 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d) (allowing for the third party material limitation defense both 
at and after the pleading stage), with HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate 
Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,862 (allowing for the defendant to challenge the plaintiff’s as-
sumptions about models or algorithms). 
 144 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)(2)(i). 
 145 Id. Specifically, this new defense states that defendants can show: 
[The] policy or practice is intended to predict an occurrence of an outcome, the predic-
tion represents a valid interest, and the outcome predicted by the policy or practice does 
not or would not have a disparate impact on protected classes compared to similarly sit-
uated individuals not part of the protected class. 
Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. § 100.500(f). 
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only enforce monetary penalties in cases where a defendant has previously 
violated the FHA.148 Following the change in administration, on January 27, 
2021, President Joe Biden directed the HUD to once again revisit the final rule 
with the goal to improve housing equality.149 
II. DISCRIMINATION AND THE APPLICATION OF FHA DISPARATE IMPACT 
To understand the goals of the HUD’s new rule, it would be prudent to look 
at the trends of nearly fifty years of FHA disparate impact liability.150 This Part 
explores how courts have dealt with FHA disparate impact claims since their in-
ception in 1974.151 Section A provides a statistical overview of appellate deci-
sions that have had positive outcomes.152 Section B considers the positive out-
comes in the context of FHA disparate impact claims for lending discrimina-
tion.153 
A. FHA Disparate Impact Claims 
Between 1974—when the U.S. Supreme Court first recognized disparate 
impact liability—and the 2013 HUD rule, ninety-two FHA disparate impact 
claims reached an appellate court, where the court made a substantive decision 
on the disparate impact claim (Viable Appellate Cases).154 Of the Viable Ap-
pellate Cases, almost twenty percent resulted in positive outcomes for the 
plaintiffs.155 
                                                                                                                           
 148 Id. The HUD also suggested that courts should only focus on the equitable reforms as well. Id. 
Further, HUD restricted administrative hearings to non-monetary damages. Id. 
 149 See Biden Calls for Review of HUD’s 2020 Disparate Impact Rule, ABA BANKING J. (Jan. 27, 
2021), https://bankingjournal.aba.com/2021/01/biden-calls-for-review-of-huds-2020-disparate-impact-
rule/ [https://perma.cc/E28X-4LPA] (advising the HUD to “take any necessary steps, as appropriate 
and consistent with applicable law, to implement the Fair Housing Act’s requirements that HUD ad-
minister its programs in a manner that affirmatively furthers fair housing and HUD’s overall duty to 
administer the Act . . . including by preventing practices with an unjustified discriminatory effect” 
(statement of President Joe Biden)). 
 150 See infra notes 154–191 and accompanying text. 
 151 See infra notes 154–191 and accompanying text. 
 152 See infra notes 154–163 and accompanying text. 
 153 See infra notes 164–191 and accompanying text. 
 154 Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having an Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty 
Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Fair Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 391–92 
(2013). The first appellate case claiming discriminatory effects under the FHA arose in 1974. See 
United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974) (“Effect, and not motivation, 
is the touchstone, in part because clever men may easily conceal their motivations, but more im-
portantly, because whatever our law was once, we now firmly recognize that the arbitrary quality of 
thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversi-
ty of a willful scheme.”). 
 155 Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, at 399 fig.6. Only eighteen out of ninety-two, or 19.6%, of the 
appellate disparate impact claims, where the court made a substantive decision on the disparate impact 
claim (Viable Appellate Cases), were positive. Id. Positive outcomes do not necessarily refer to a final 
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Since 2013, both judicial precedent and regulatory frameworks have al-
tered the nature of FHA disparate impact analysis.156 This Note replicates the 
FHA disparate impact data created by Stacy Seicschnaydre, Associate Dean at 
Tulane Law School.157 The empirical process involved using a specific search 
term on Westlaw, narrowing by appellate cases only, limiting the date range to 
exclude prior research, and analyzing the 186 resulting cases to filter for Via-
ble Appellate Cases.158 
Of the twenty-nine ensuing decisions, almost twenty-five percent of cases 
resulted in positive outcomes for the plaintiff.159 Still, this means that since the 
inception of the cognoscibility of disparate impact liability, slightly more than 
twenty percent of cases have resulted in positive outcomes for plaintiffs.160 
Moreover, between the first appellate disparate impact case in 1974 and the 
promulgation of the HUD’s final rule on the Implementation of the Fair Hous-
ing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard in 2013, there have been approxi-
mately two Viable Appellate Cases per year.161 Over the past seven years, since 
the promulgation of the 2013 HUD rule, the frequency of Viable Appellate 
                                                                                                                           
judgment on the disparate impact claim. Id. at 394. Instead, in this context, positive outcomes also 
refer to affirmations of trial decisions in favor of plaintiffs, reversals of trial decisions against the 
plaintiff, and reversals of dismissals of the disparate impact claim. Id. at 394–95. Out of the eighteen 
cases, there were five affirmed judgments in favor of the plaintiff, four reversals of judgments against 
the plaintiff, four reversals of pleading dismissals, one ruling deeming disparate impact cognizable, 
and four reversals of summary judgment. Id.  
 156 See supra notes 76–149 and accompanying text (comparing the 2013 disparate impact rule, the 
U.S. Supreme Court disparate impact precedent in Texas Department of Housing & Community Af-
fairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., the 2019 proposed disparate impact rule, and the 2020 
final disparate impact rule). 
 157 See Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, at 392 n.216 (outlining the empirical research process); Stacy 
Seicshnaydre: Biography, TUL. L. SCH., https://law.tulane.edu/faculty/full-time/stacy-seicshnaydre 
[https://perma.cc/ALS3-AN8J]. 
 158 See Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, at 392 n.216 (using the following Westlaw search key: 
disp! discrim! /2 impact! effect! & “fair housing act” FHA 3604, and narrowing the results to cases 
decided on the disparate impact FHA claim). The search narrowed from July 1, 2013, to February 2, 
2020, and resulted in 186 cases. Id. 
 159 See infra Appendix. Seven of the twenty-nine cases, or 24.1%, resulted in positive outcomes 
for the plaintiffs. Id. 
 160 Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, app. A; see infra Appendix. Since inception, 25 out of 121 
Viable Appellate Cases, or 20.7%, have resulted in positive outcomes for plaintiffs. See Seicshnaydre, 
supra note 154, app. A; infra Appendix. Averages are rounded to the nearest whole month. See infra 
Appendix. For example, the time between February 15, 2013, and February 5, 2020, is six years, elev-
en months, and twenty-two days. Id. The calculation for cases per year for this time period is seven 
years. Id. 
 161 Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, app. A. Specifically, there have been an average of 2.4 Viable 
Appellate Cases per year between December 27, 1974, the first appellate disparate impact case, and 
February 15, 2013, the promulgation of the HUD’s final rule on the Implementation of the Fair Hous-
ing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard. Id. 
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Cases per year nearly doubled.162 Notably, only one of the cases since 2013 
was a class action suit, and the court did not grant class status.163 
B. Disparate Impact as Applied to Lending Discrimination 
Lending discrimination is a paradigmatic example for analyzing the ef-
fects of disparate impact liability because of the emergence of fraudulent prac-
tices leading up to the 2008 financial collapse and the intricacy of factors that 
contribute to credit-issuing decisions.164 This makes the required intent for dis-
parate treatment extremely difficult to prove.165 Legal scholars often only fo-
cused on lending discrimination that occurred when a lender denied an appli-
cant a loan for discriminatory reasons.166 Following the housing market col-
                                                                                                                           
 162 See Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, app. A; infra Appendix. The average annual Viable Appel-
late Cases has increased from 2.4 cases per year to 4.3 cases per year. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 
154, app. A; infra Appendix. 
 163 See Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, 656 F. App’x 555, 556–57 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that the 
plaintiff could not meet the class certification requirements). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
have four prerequisites to be certified as a class: (1) numerosity, (2) commonality of law or fact, (3) 
typicality in the representative parties, and (4) fair representation from the representative parties. FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23(a). Additionally, a court must find that the common questions of law or fact “predomi-
nate over any [individual] questions” of law or fact and that class certification is the “superior” meth-
od of resolving the case. Id. R. 23(b)(3). In 2016, in Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, the plaintiffs, a group 
of Black homeowners, alleged that the defendants, Morgan Stanley and related entities, caused a home 
lender to make high-cost, high-risk loans. 656 F. App’x at 556. The U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York did not certify the class for failure to meet the typicality in the representative 
requirement, as well as the “predominance and superiority requirements.” Id. The district court con-
cluded that because each plaintiff’s loans had different characteristics, each individual required differ-
ent proof of harm and causation. Id. at 556–57. On appeal, the plaintiffs did not challenge this finding, 
but they compelled the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Court to certify the class none-
theless and proposed a narrower class. Id. at 557. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
rejection of class certification because to do so would essentially change the nature of the case and 
“unfairly prejudice” defendants. Id. In contrast, class action filings are more common in other con-
texts, such as securities class actions. See, e.g., CORNERSTONE RSCH., SECURITIES CLASS ACTION 
FILINGS: 2019 YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2019), https://www.cornerstone.com/Publications/Reports/
Securities-Class-Action-Filings-2019-Year-in-Review [https://perma.cc/s9ku-ubkk] (demonstrating 
that plaintiffs filed a total of 428 securities class action lawsuits in 2019). 
 164 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (describing the financial crisis in 2008). 
 165 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (giving examples of the types of potentially discrim-
inatory decisions that lenders can make behind closed doors, such as complex underwriting algorithms 
and methods for pushing buyers towards subprime loans). 
 166 Yinger, supra note 19, at 30 (stating that refusing to approve a loan is the most serious and 
obvious type of lending discrimination); see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 18, at 21 (describing 
the early stages of subprime lending). According to one scholar, discrimination in mortgage lending 
exists when the probability of rejection is not only a function of the expected rate of return on the 
loan, including the applicant, property, and loan characteristics, but also considers minority status or 
neighborhood location not relevant to the rate of return. Yinger, supra note 19, at 32. This function of 
lending discrimination demonstrates that other forms of lending discrimination, such as subprime 
lending, were merely afterthoughts. See id. at 62 (“Discrimination by mortgage lenders exists when 
lenders deny loans to minorities (or treat them unfavorably in other ways) after controlling for the 
factors that influence the returns on a loan.”). 
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lapse of 2008, it became clear that predatory lending practices were rampant 
well before the market collapsed, and the practices involved more—and argua-
bly worse—than plain denial of credit.167 
First, lenders would extract exorbitant fees from borrowers, such as credit 
insurance financed as part of the loan (which accumulated interest), discount 
points, and prepayment penalties.168 So, where a $300,000 prime loan might 
generate $5,000 in fees upfront, the same amount on a subprime loan would 
generate three times that amount in fees.169 Lenders would also set high inter-
est rates.170 To conceal the rates, some of these interest rates could be adjusta-
ble-rate-mortgages with favorable initial rates that increased over time or re-
sulted in balloon payments that increased on fixed dates.171 Lenders typically 
targeted Black and Latinx neighborhoods with subprime loans characterized by 
high fees and high interest rates, which were effectively unaffordable and des-
tined for default.172 Opportunities to obtain credit in minority neighborhoods 
                                                                                                                           
 167 See ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 18, at 21–22 (arguing that predatory lending began with 
small-shop lenders before becoming ingrained in large banking institutions). Subprime generally re-
fers to risky alternative mortgages to traditional loans. Id. at 34. These can also be described as Alt-A, 
nonprime, or predatory loans. Id. at 42. Dating back to the 1990s and following banking industry 
deregulation in the 1980s, securitization made subprime lending attractive for large banking institu-
tions. Id. at 16–18. In the 1970s, strict government policies on home mortgages hindered the real es-
tate market. Id. at 16. These policies led to astronomical interest rates on mortgages, and eventually, 
home ownership was not an option for most people. See id. (noting that in the 1970s, the mean interest 
rate on a thirty-year fixed loan rose by 6.36% to 13.74%). In the 1980s, Congress stepped in and elim-
inated interest rate caps, allowed for alternative loans, and preempted laws that were inconsistent with 
these laws. Id. This deregulation, however, is what ultimately gave banks the ability to create sub-
prime loans. Id. 
 168 Id. at 22, 24. 
 169 See id. at 37 (comparing a standard fixed-rate mortgage with borrower documentation of in-
come to a subprime loan where the borrower only states income without any documented proof). For 
the sake of speed and no-hassle, lenders would rarely ask for pay stubs or other proof of income. Id. 
Instead, they would steer consumers towards “low-doc” or “no-doc” loans where the lender would 
reap the benefits of higher up-front fees. Id. 
 170 Id. at 22. 
 171 Id. at 23. Even more egregious, at closing, lenders would unexpectedly switch the loan terms 
that they originally described to the borrower from fixed-rate to subprime adjustable-rate-mortgages 
(ARMs). Id. at 24. Borrowers either did not notice, could not comprehend the terms, or by closing 
time, were too psychologically invested in home ownership to care or realize the ramifications. See id. 
(describing these “[b]ait-and-switch” tactics). 
 172 Id. at 22. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) defines lending discrimination 
under the FHA by admonishing seven practices that might disparately treat or impact a protected class. 
See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., CONSUMER COMPLIANCE EXAMINATION MANUAL ch. IV, § 1.1–.2 
(2019), https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/compliance/manual/ComplianceExaminationManual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6F92-8TQQ] (listing seven prohibited discriminatory lending practices). The FDIC 
states that a lender cannot: (1) omit or change information or services throughout the lending process; 
(2) steer borrowers towards different credit products; (3) deny credit or use different standards of 
reviewing applications; (4) vary terms of loans such as the amount, interest rate, duration, or type; (5) 
use different methods for collateral appraisal; (6) service a loan differently for certain individuals; and 
(7) pool loans differently in the secondary market. Id.  
2021] The Future of Disparate Impact Liability 1351 
has historically been rare.173 Lenders targeted these inexperienced borrowers 
who particularly needed credit and could more easily be convinced to sign up 
for a subprime mortgage.174 
The 2018 case, City of Philadelphia v. Wells Fargo & Co., illustrates these 
predatory practices. In City of Philadelphia, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania explained that the plaintiff, the City of Phila-
delphia, brought a plausible claim for disparate impact under the FHA, and 
then it denied the defendants’, Wells Fargo & Co. and related organizations, 
motion to dismiss.175 The plaintiff claimed that, for at least ten years, seven 
facially neutral lending policies created an “artificial, arbitrary, and unneces-
sary” barrier to credit opportunities for minority applicants in Philadelphia.176 
Between 2004 and 2014, Black and Latinx individuals were around twice as 
likely to receive a subprime loan than similarly situated white borrowers.177 
                                                                                                                           
 173 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 18, at 22. 
 174 Id. 
 175 See City of Philadelphia v. Wells Fargo & Co., C.A. No. 17-cv-02203, 2018 WL 424451, at 
*3–4 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2018) (explaining that the plaintiff identified specific policies that caused 
disparate impacts). In 2018, in City of Philadelphia v. Wells Fargo & Co., the plaintiff, the City of 
Philadelphia, alleged that Black and Latinx borrowers with Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO) scores 
similar to white borrowers were more than two times as likely to receive a subprime loan. See id. at *9 
(outlining the plaintiff’s disparate impact allegation); see also Christopher P. Guzelian et al., Credit 
Scores, Lending, and Psychosocial Disability, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1807, 1811–24 (2015) (explaining 
FICO scores). 
 176 Complaint for Violations of the Federal Fair Housing Act at 5, 17–18, City of Philadelphia, 
2018 WL 424451 (C.A. No. 17-cv-02203). Practices included: (1) allowing for discretion to issue 
expensive and riskier loans, even when a borrower qualified for more stable loans; (2) allowing dis-
cretion to refrain from explaining actual characteristics of loans; (3) targeting minority areas for high-
risk loans; (4) using monetary incentives to encourage officers to sell high-risk loans; (5) issuing pre-
payment penalties preventing refinancing to type-A (prime) loans; (6) arbitrarily charging fees; and 
(7) failing to provide loan officers with accurate information about what the defendants, Wells Fargo 
& Co. and related entities, could actually offer a consumer. Id.  
 177 Id. at 29. Black borrowers were 2.102 times more likely and Latinx borrowers were 1.655 
times more likely to receive a subprime loan than a similarly situated white borrowers. Id. These 
numbers are even more concerning when comparing only borrowers with FICO scores above 660. Id. 
In that case, Black borrowers were 2.570 times more likely and Latinx borrowers were 2.073 more 
likely to receive subprime loans. Id. Thus, minority borrowers who otherwise qualified for more af-
fordable and stable loans instead received riskier ones, including rate-spread reportable and high-cost 
loans, subprime loans, interest-only loans, balloon payment loans, loans with prepayment penalties, 
negative amortization loans, no documentation loans, higher-cost government loans, and ARMs with 
teaser rates. Id. at 28. The CFPB defined rate-spread reportable loans were defined by comparing the 
annual percentage rate (APR) of a particular loan with the average prime offer rate (APOR). Home 
Mortgage Disclosure (Regulation C), 80 Fed. Reg. 66,127, 66,197–66,198 (Oct. 28, 2015) (codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 1000). To calculate the APOR, the CFPB compiles loan information from representative 
prime loans. Id. at 66,329. At the time of City of Philadelphia, if a loan’s APR was more than 1.5% or 
3.5% of the APOR (depending on the type of loan) the lending institution was required to report the 
details of that loan to the CFPB. Id. at 66,198. Today, lending institutions are required to report the 
rate-spread for virtually all home mortgages. See id. (adopting a proposal to require reporting regard-
less of threshold). On interest-only loans, borrowers would have a period of time where they paid only 
interest on their loans. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 18, at 34. After that period was over, suddenly, 
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While there were just six Viable Appellate Cases for lending discrimination 
between 1974 and 2013, there have been eight Viable Appellate Cases since the 
promulgation of the 2013 rule.178 The case frequency for lending discrimination 
has more than quintupled.179 Notably, there were no positive outcomes for plain-
tiffs before the 2013 HUD promulgation.180 Since then, more than a third of cas-
es have resulted in such positive outcomes.181 Although lending discrimination is 
just one example of where disparate impact liability is available, other forms of 
discrimination, including housing barriers, have seen similar patterns.182 
These patterns indicate that disparate impact claims may see more time in 
court, but the courts are still reluctant to rule in favor of the plaintiffs.183 For 
                                                                                                                           
borrowers would have to pay principal on the loan, which many borrowers could not afford. Id. Simi-
larly, balloon payments result when a borrower has to pay more than double the average of previous 
payments. 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
 178 See infra Appendix. 
 179 See infra Appendix. Frequency for disparate impact cases has increased from an average of 
0.2 cases per year to 1.1 cases per year. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, app. A; infra Appendix. 
 180 See infra Appendix. 
 181 See infra Appendix. Three out of the eight cases have resulted in positive outcomes for plain-
tiffs, or 37.5%. See infra Appendix.  
 182 See Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, at 402 (stating that 44.4% of positive outcome FHA dispar-
ate impact appellate cases between 1974 and 2013 were housing barrier cases). Housing barrier claims 
are arguably the most successful and most common FHA disparate impact claims. Id. Housing barri-
ers are the result of municipal organizations, and are responsible for housing decisions including zon-
ing, planning and adjustments, promulgating or enforcing rules, and regulations that cause discrimina-
tory effects. See id. at 361, 399–400 (explaining that housing barriers can discriminate by limiting 
availability of housing for minority groups, segregating minority groups to certain areas, or denying 
housing and freedom of movement). This subset does not include disability accommodations because 
of their unique requirements under the FHA. See id. at 400 n.233. In fact, the first FHA disparate 
impact case to reach an appellate court reviewed a challenged housing barrier. See United States v. 
City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) (reviewing a challenge to a restrictive multi-
family home ordinance). In 1974, in United States v. City of Black Jack, as in typical housing barrier 
actions, the defendant, the City of Black Jack Zoning Commission, enacted an ordinance that prevent-
ed the development of multi-family homes and made the prior multi-family homes nonconforming 
uses. Id. at 1183; see In re Coleman Highlands, 777 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1989) (defining 
nonconforming uses as uses that were legal before the zoning ordinance and that continue to be legal 
after the ordinance). Although the composition of the city was 99% white, the areas surrounding the 
city were racially and ethnically mixed. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1183. For example, two miles 
outside the defendant’s school district, 100% of the students in the Kinloch School District were 
Black. Id. The percentage of Black people in the City of St. Louis was 40.9% in 1970, just thirteen 
miles from the defendant. Id.; Driving Directions from Black Jack, MO to St. Louis, MO, GOOGLE 
MAPS, https://www.google.com/maps/dir/Black+Jack,+MO/St.+Louis,+MO/@38.7100442 [https://
perma.cc/ZH9U-8E7A]. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the plaintiff, the 
United States suing on behalf of citizens denied housing based on their race, successfully alleged 
disparate impact because the defendant failed to proffer a reasonable justification for the zoning ordi-
nance. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1188. As a result, the court issued a permanent injunction. Id.  
 183 See Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, app. A. For example, the most recent positive outcome for 
housing barriers was almost forty-two years after City of Black Jack. See Ave. 6E Invs., LLC v. City 
of Yuma, 818 F.3d 493, 513 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding in favor of the plaintiff on a denied re-zoning 
request). In response to the outcry of neighbors in opposition to a proposed affordable Hispanic-
targeted neighborhood development, the plaintiffs in Avenue 6E Investments, LLC v. City of Yuma, 
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instance, in 2017, in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., on nearly iden-
tical facts to City of Philadelphia v. Wells Fargo & Co., the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision granting sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, Wells Fargo & Co. and affiliated entities, 
holding that the plaintiff, the City of Los Angeles, failed to prove discriminato-
ry lending on a theory of disparate impact.184 In its original complaint, the 
plaintiff alleged that five policies caused discriminatory effects against minori-
ty borrowers.185 The plaintiff used statistical analyses to show that Black indi-
                                                                                                                           
real estate developers, alleged that the defendant, the Yuma City Council, wrongfully denied the re-
zoning request required for construction. Id. at 508. Residents of the abutting neighborhood used “not-
in-my-backyard” (commonly referred to as “NIMBY”) arguments to oppose the development. Id. at 
498, 508. In 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs could bring a 
disparate impact claim and reversed and remanded the issue to the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Arizona. Id. at 513. Thus, including these cases, there have been a total of twenty-nine Viable Ap-
pellate Cases for housing barriers, ten of which have been successful, approximately 34.5% of the 
total number of cases. See Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, app. B (listing the housing barrier cases by 
type and denoting those that had positive outcomes); infra Appendix. Between December 27, 1974, 
and February 15, 2013, there were nineteen Viable Appellate Cases, eight of which, or 42.1%, had 
positive outcomes. See infra Appendix. (denoting eight successful cases out of the nineteen Viable 
Appellate Cases). Thus, during that period, there was an average of 0.5 housing barrier cases per year. 
See id. (listing nineteen cases between 1974 and 2013). Since February 15, 2013, there have been an 
additional ten housing barrier cases, nearly tripling the number of actions, bringing it to an average of 
1.4 cases per year. See infra Appendix. (listing ten cases between the aforementioned timeframe). The 
success rate since the promulgation of the final HUD rule, however, has dropped to 20%, with only 
two appeals resulting in positive outcomes. See infra Appendix (marking only seven successful cases).  
 184 See City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., 691 F. App’x 453, 454–55 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(holding that the plaintiff failed to prove disparate impact). In 2017, in City of Los Angeles v. Wells 
Fargo & Co., the plaintiff, the City of Los Angeles, put forward allegations of both disparate impact 
and treatment. Id. at 454. The U.S. Court of Appels for the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff did not 
demonstrate a robust causal link between the policies and discriminatory effects, and it therefore af-
firmed the lower court’s grant of summary judgement. Id. at 455. 
 185 See Complaint for Violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act at 34–35, 40, City of Los Ange-
les v. Wells Fargo & Co., C.A. No. 13-cv-09007, 2015 WL 4398858 (C.D. Cal. July 17, 2015), aff’d, 
691 F. App’x 453 (9th Cir. 2017) (identifying at least five policies or practices). The plaintiff used 
witness testimony, including company employees, to prove that the discriminatory policies were in 
place at the time. Id. at 40. First, the compensation structure encouraged subprime lending. Id. at 34. 
For example, brokers could receive $1,500 difference in compensation for originating a $300,000 
subprime loan rather than a $300,000 prime loan. Id. at 20. The defendants, Wells Fargo & Co. and 
affiliates, communicated the different compensation rates to brokers every day via email and online. 
Id. at 24. This structure was a companywide policy. Id. at 39. Second, the defendants marketed sub-
prime loans to minority communities. See id. at 35, 40 (referencing the promotional policies in the 
disparate impact portion of the complaint, and elaborating on the policies in the disparate treatment 
portion of the complaint). For example, one employee noted that the defendants almost exclusively 
marketed subprime mortgages to churches with a predominantly Black congregation. Id. at 42. Third, 
the brokers had ample discretion to qualify borrowers for subprime loans when they were eligible for 
prime loans. See id. at 34. In case of any doubt as to the discretion of the loan officers, the defendants 
ratified all the discretionarily priced loans. Id. at 26. For example, one employee noted that some loan 
officers’ structuring decisions were largely arbitrary and merely intended to drive up costs. See id. at 
43–44 (demonstrating that one employee received up to 50% commission on referrals to a subprime 
division). Fourth, nothing required these brokers to justify their decisions to qualify borrowers for the 
Alt-A loans. Id. at 34–35. Fifth, the defendants failed to monitor the discriminatory effects these dis-
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viduals were more than eight times as likely, and Latinx individuals were more 
than four times as likely, to receive more expensive loans than similarly situat-
ed white individuals.186 As for causation, the plaintiff alleged that high-ranking 
officers had concrete knowledge that these policies resulted in discriminatory 
effects.187 
The Ninth Circuit only analyzed the robust causation requirement, and it 
largely ignored the statistical disparities.188 Consequently, the court only iden-
tified three of the policies of interest: (1) compensation incentives for discrim-
ination, (2) minority targeted marketing, and (3) a lack of oversight.189 Ulti-
mately, the court stated that the plaintiff failed to show robust causation be-
tween the policies and the discriminatory effects.190 Thus, the court affirmed 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants.191 
III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND THE  
EFFECT ON TYPICAL DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIMS 
Although the result of the final rule may be speculative, an analysis of the 
statute will suggest that the housing market, including borrowers, may feel 
substantial effects.192 Section A of this Part analyzes how the proposed rule is 
making it impracticably harder to prove disparate impact, looking towards lend-
ing discrimination as an example.193 Section B suggests an alternative frame-
                                                                                                                           
cretionary practices had on minority borrowers. Id. at 35. Even though monitoring was scarce, there 
was enough oversight that the defendants should have known about the discriminatory practices. See 
id. at 22 (noting that even with the knowledge of discrimination, the defendants did not remedy the 
practices). 
 186 Plaintiff-Appellant’s Opening Brief at 28, City of Los Angeles, 691 F. App’x 453 (C.A. No. 
15-56157). Ian Ayres, a professor of Yale Law and Business Schools and former mortgage and lend-
ing economist with the U.S. Department of Justice, analyzed the discovery data on lending from Wells 
Fargo. Id. at 20, 22. He concluded that the discriminatory practices adversely affected minority bor-
rowers. See id. at 22, 28 (concluding that the minority borrowers were significantly more likely to 
receive FHA and high-cost loans). 
 187 See Complaint for Violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act, supra note 185, at 38 (identify-
ing at least five policies or practices that were discriminatory in effect). For example, one communica-
tion between senior and executive vice presidents discussed the different tactics for originating sub-
prime loans, even when borrowers qualified for prime loans. Id. at 35. None of the officers took action 
to remedy the situation. Id. 
 188 City of Los Angeles, 691 F. App’x at 454–55. 
 189 Id. The Ninth Circuit did not mention the policies of discretionary pricing or lack of required 
justification for pricing. See id. (listing three policies). 
 190 Id. 
 191 Id. 
 192 See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. 
Reg. 42,854, 42,862–42,863 (Aug. 19, 2019) (codified as amended at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (proposing 
the new disparate impact rule). 
 193 See infra notes 195–224 and accompanying text. 
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work for pleading, defending, and analyzing Fair Housing Act disparate impact 
claims that balances the interests of plaintiffs, defendants, and the public alike.194 
A. Effects of the New Disparate Impact Rule 
At a minimum, the new disparate impact rule is not intended to simplify 
pleading and review of FHA claims.195 At the first stage—the pleading stage—
instead of establishing a prima facie case by pointing to a policy, procedure, or 
practice that caused a discriminatory effect, a plaintiff instead must state facts 
that plausibly meet an exacting five-part pleading standard.196 The first two 
elements of the pleading may be too rigorous for virtually any plaintiff to 
meet.197 
The first pleading element requires the plaintiff to challenge a policy or 
practice as “arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary” but framed as a legitimate 
interest.198 The HUD readily admits that plaintiffs will not know what interest 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See infra notes 225–242 and accompanying text. 
 195 Compare 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b) (2021) (demonstrating that the new rule is more exacting, 
longer, and contains undefined terms), with 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013). 
 196 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2021). Although the final rule does not state the plausible allegation 
requirement that the proposed rule did, it is likely that plaintiffs will have to meet this precedential 
standard. Compare id. (requiring plaintiffs to plead facts that sufficiently allege the five elements), 
with HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 
42,862 (requiring plaintiffs to plausibly allege facts to plead a claim for disparate impact). In the lend-
ing context, the ability for a plaintiff to plausibly allege facts may be difficult prior to discovery. See 
HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,858 
(noting, for example, that at the early stages of litigation, a plaintiff might not even know what policy 
a defendant might proffer in response to disparate impact allegations). A plaintiff must meet the plead-
ing requirements in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) to move beyond the pleading stage 
and overcome a motion to dismiss. FED. R. CIV. P. 8, 12(b)(6). The FRCP states that a plaintiff must 
plead a case by making a short and plain statement of the claim and remedy. Id. Generally, plaintiffs 
must put forth enough facts to suggest their allegations are plausible, not merely conceivable or specu-
lative. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554–55 (2007). Importantly, a complaint must as-
sert facts and not simply conclusory statements. Id. at 555. From these facts, a court should be able to 
make a reasonable inference of liability. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 667 (2009). This deviation 
from general “notice pleading,” only requiring plaintiffs to give defendants notice of litigation, pur-
posefully increased the requirements for plaintiffs to reach discovery. Arthur R. Miller, From Conley 
to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 42–43 
(2010). Some critics, however, argue that the new pleading requirements unfairly burden plaintiffs. Id. 
at 43. The HUD rule will further exacerbate the requirements a plaintiff must meet to plausibly allege 
a claim for disparate impact, especially because it may be particularly difficult to plausibly allege a 
claim where there may be no facts supporting overt bigotry. Compare 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2021) 
(outlining a five-part pleading requirement with a higher level of specificity in the factual allegations), 
with 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2013) (outlining only three requirements for pleading). 
 197 See infra notes 198–214 and accompanying text (noting the difficulty in overcoming the “arbi-
trary, artificial, and unnecessary” and the “robust causal link” standards). 
 198 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2021). The HUD recognizes that a plaintiff will virtually be unable to 
bring a disparate impact claim against a one-time decision unless that decision is equivalent to a poli-
cy or practice. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. 
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or objective a defendant might proffer as justification.199 Thus, the plaintiff 
will theoretically be unable to plead specific facts satisfying this element.200 In 
that situation, the HUD suggests that plaintiffs plausibly allege that the policy 
or practice simply does not advance even a single legitimate interest or objec-
tive.201 If a plaintiff somehow meets this burden, a defendant can simply rebut 
this claim by identifying an alternative legitimate interest.202 In the preamble 
for the 2013 FHA disparate impact rule, the HUD expressly sought to ensure 
that neither party was “saddled” with this impossible burden of proving a 
negative.203 The 2020 rule expressly places this burden on the plaintiff, and the 
proposal cited the wrong holding of a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Eighth Circuit as justification for doing so.204 
Even in the seemingly rare case of an identifiable policy or interest, the 
HUD does not provide guidance in the new rule as to what would render such 
a policy as “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary.”205 Although the U.S. Su-
preme Court in 2015 referred to the “arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary” lan-
guage in dicta in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclu-
sive Communities Project, Inc., the Court did not define what this standard en-
tails, or even suggest that it is an element for the pleading.206 Particularly in the 
                                                                                                                           
Reg. at 42,858. The HUD rule provides examples such as a zoning decision or a decision to construct 
a building, which are out of reach from disparate impact liability. Id. 
 199 HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 
42,858. 
 200 See id. (stating that a plaintiff will not be able to plead facts in a situation where there is no 
identifiable objective). 
 201 Id. Otherwise, if there is an identifiable legitimate objective, the plaintiff will have to plausibly 
allege facts showing that the objective is “arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary.” Id. 
 202 Id. at 42,859–42,860. 
 203 Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 Fed. Reg. 
70,921, 70,924 (Nov. 16, 2011) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (quoting Hisps. United of DuPage 
Cnty. v. Vill. of Addison, 988 F. Supp. 1130, 1162 (N.D. Ill. 1997)). For this explicit reason, the 2013 
rule places the burden on the defendant to prove the policy’s necessary relationship to the stated inter-
est. Id. 
 204 See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 60,288, 60,312 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100); HUD’s Implementation of the 
Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,862 (placing the burden on the 
plaintiff to plausibly allege facts that a policy is “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary”). The HUD 
cites Ellis v. City of Minneapolis as a justification. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s 
Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at 60,312 (citing Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 
1112–14 (8th Cir. 2017)). In 2017, in Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit suggested that a plaintiff must allege facts regarding the arbitrary nature of a policy. 
860 F.32d at 1112. Still, the court ultimately concluded that the bare minimum requirement under 
Inclusive Communities is for a plaintiff to simply “point” to an arbitrary policy. Id. at 1114. 
 205 See HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. 
Reg. at 42,862 (neglecting to elaborate on what this pleading requirement entails). 
 206 See 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 
(1971)) (stating that disparate impact has been limited to avoid interplay with constitutional dilem-
mas). In 1971, in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that the corner-
stone of an “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary” practice is job performance. 401 U.S. at 431. In 
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lending context, it is not difficult to imagine that a claim will fall short with 
regards to the first element because, as the Court conceded, there are “multiple 
factors that go into investment decisions,” which are often made behind the 
scenes and not explicitly expressed.207 This makes it fairly easy for a defendant 
to rebut the plaintiff’s allegation prior to discovery.208 
For similar reasons, the third element—causal link—is likely an insur-
mountable standard for a plaintiff.209 The HUD expects a plaintiff to allege a 
“robust causal link,” showing that the policy or practice was the direct cause of 
the discriminatory effects.210 Because this element is required at the pleading 
stage, a plaintiff will not be able to conduct discovery to determine if there is a 
causal link, let alone this undefined and ostensibly enhanced standard of “ro-
bust.”211 Disparate impact cases commonly use evidence of statistical dispari-
ties related to a policy or procedure.212 Again, given that there are a variety of 
reasons that could contribute to a lending decision, it may be difficult to dis-
cern whether there are confounding variables or a combination of complex 
                                                                                                                           
2015, in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 
however, the U.S. Supreme Court did not indicate what the cornerstone would be in the housing con-
text, beyond necessity. See 135 S. Ct. at 2523 (failing to articulate a definite standard to identify a 
practice). Furthermore, the HUD explicitly declined to define or give examples of an “arbitrary, artifi-
cial, and unnecessary” practice. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact 
Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at 60,310.  
 207 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2523–24 (discussing the complex nature of 
investment decisions). 
 208 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(3) (2021) (outlining the many ways in which a defendant can 
rebut a plaintiff’s allegations). 
 209 See id. (requiring a plaintiff to show robust causality, but not explaining what this entails). 
 210 Id. The only guidance the HUD provides for the causal link element is that plaintiffs must use 
an appropriate comparison to show that the policy is the actual cause of the disparity. HUD’s Imple-
mentation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 42,858, 42,862. In the 
HUD’s explanation, it provides no guidance as to what an appropriate comparison might entail. See 
id. (stating only that statistical disparities are not enough to prove disparate impact). 
 211 HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. at 
42,858, 42,862 (requiring that a plaintiff allege facts supporting robust causality at the pleading stage); 
see also Miller, supra note 196, at 45 (discussing the issue of information asymmetry, where a plain-
tiff who may have a legitimate claim has to plead with factual sufficiency before conducting any dis-
covery). Heightening pleading standards beyond what plaintiffs could possibly know restricts their 
access to civil remedies by disincentivizing plaintiffs from bringing lending discrimination claims. See 
Miller, supra note 196, at 45 (arguing that heightened pleading standards, like those required by Bell 
Atlantic Co. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal can deny access to relief). 
 212 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Wells Fargo & Co., C.A. No. 17-cv-02203, 2018 WL 
424451, at *1, *4 n.7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 16, 2018) (discussing the plaintiff’s statistical evidence in support 
of its claim). 
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variables hiding robust causation.213 The Supreme Court did not elaborate on 
the meaning of robust causality as compared to previous standards.214 
The method by which the HUD allows a defendant to rebut pleadings 
poses significant issues as well.215 Under the new rule, defendants can demon-
strate that practices predicting outcomes, even if they have a disparate impact, 
are acceptable so long as the outcome is a legitimate interest.216 The HUD 
gives the example of predictive models, including automated underwriting, 
that accurately calculates risk.217 The reality of modern lending is that, at least 
since the 1980s, creditors are no longer manually underwriting loans to deter-
mine the creditworthiness of an applicant.218 Instead, underwriting is generally 
                                                                                                                           
 213 See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 
2524 (2015) (discussing the complexity of investment decisions), remand to 795 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 
2015), remand to C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2016 WL 4494322 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2016). 
 214 See id. (refraining from elaborating on the potential new requirements of a “robust causality 
requirement”). The HUD slightly explained that the “robust causal link” means the “direct cause,” but 
refused to define it any further. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact 
Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,288, 60,312 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). 
 215 See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)(2)(i) (allowing significant leeway for a defendant to rebut at 
the pleading stage). 
 216 Id. Unlike the proposed rule, the final rule does not explicitly mention algorithms. HUD’s 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at 60,290. The 
HUD notes, however, that the predictive assessment defense is intended to replace the algorithm de-
fense. Id. The concern for including an explicit algorithm defense is that it would be too expansive 
and that technology law is still developing. Id. Still, it is difficult to see how replacing “algorithms” 
with “prediction model[s]” will narrow the defense. See id. (noting that the defense will still allow 
defendants to justify their predictive models). 
 217 HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at 
60,290. In the HUD’s example, a plaintiff alleged that members of a protected class were rejected for 
loans more than non-protected individuals. Id. A defendant could then use the predictive model to 
show that protected individuals who are approved for loans default at the same rate as non-protected 
individuals and avoid liability. Id. This hypothetical, though, requires the assumption that to impose 
liability, the predictive model used to issue loans provides a disproportionately restrictive standard 
that causes the approved protected members to default at lower rates. Id. But the purpose of disparate 
impact is to cover facially neutral choices that are unrelated to the legitimate interest. CARPENTER, 
supra note 20, at 5. So, for example, it is not difficult to imagine a situation where a lender uses crite-
ria like neighborhood to determine whether to issue a loan. But cf. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair 
Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. at 60,290 (giving a hypothetical of an overly 
restrictive predictive model that would cause less defaults among approved members of a protected 
class). This decision would narrow the pool of eligible loan applicants, but it would not necessarily 
mean that eligible applicants are less likely to default. Contra id. (arguing that if a predictive model is 
discriminatory, then approved protected individuals should be defaulting at lower rates). 
 218 See O’NEIL, supra note 18, at 141–42 (describing the methods of underwriting prior to auto-
mation); see also ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 18, at 16–17 (describing the transition from caution-
ary underwriting to automated underwriting in the 1980s). For manual underwriting, lenders would 
frequently consider an applicant’s church-going habits, familial engagement with the law, employer 
references, race, and gender. O’NEIL, supra note 18, at 141. Additionally, instead of using complicat-
ed models, lenders would use risk-averse rules, such as requiring low debt to income ratios, higher 
down payments, and significant savings. ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 18, at 16. With the advent of 
mainstream computers, it became easier to use more complicated statistical analyses to determine the 
risk of lending to individual borrowers through automated underwriting. Id. at 16–17. 
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automated, and consequently, overt discrimination is less easily identifiable.219 
Unfortunately, it can be common for data scientists to insert their inherent bi-
ases into the predictive tools, creating a prime situation for disparate impact 
liability to provide relief for affected borrowers.220 The immense amount of 
data that banks have on borrowers are calculated behind closed doors.221 These 
closed-door calculations materially affect credit-worthiness.222 The ability for a 
defendant to simply argue that a predictive tool is achieving a valid interest 
might make this claim extremely difficult to overcome.223 Ultimately, even 
                                                                                                                           
 219 ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 18, at 16–17. 
 220 O’NEIL, supra note 18, at 143, 145 (noting that e-scores, which are unregulated models that 
predict creditworthiness, tend to be based on stereotypes rather than focused on the individual bor-
rower). As an analog, consider St. George School of Medicine in the United Kingdom. Id. at 115–17. 
Around the same time that banks started using automated underwriting, St. George wanted to use 
similar technology to cut time and costs when reviewing applicant materials. Id. at 115. St. George’s 
computer system replicated prior year’s procedures of manual review. Id. at 116. Human reviewers 
typically, however, rejected applicants with grammatical typos, which resulted in higher rejection of 
foreign applicants. Id. at 117. This criterion is seemingly facially neutral. See id. (rejecting applica-
tions based on writing skills). But, by copying the manual review procedures, the system interpreted 
the review procedures to simply reject foreign applicants. Id. Additionally, manual reviewers rejected 
female applicants because of their prospect of motherhood. Id. The computerized system followed 
suit. Id. Ultimately, in 1988, the U.K. government found the school liable for discrimination. Id. at 
117. 
 221 Id. at 143. 
 222 Id. Cathy O’Neil, professional data scientist, Harvard mathematics PhD, and former professor, 
describes the gravity of how models and algorithms affect people’s daily lives: 
Today we’re added up in every conceivable way as statisticians and mathematicians 
patch together a mishmash of data, from our zip codes and Internet surfing patterns to 
our recent purchases. Many of their pseudoscientific models attempt to predict our cre-
ditworthiness, giving each of us so-called e-scores. These numbers, which we rarely 
see, open doors for some of us, while slamming them in the face of others. 
Id. For example, Capital One can often access internet search history and the location of potential 
borrowers on its website. Id. at 144. A person searching for a high-end car located in an affluent 
neighborhood is likely to be targeted with a different credit card option than someone searching for a 
used low-end car in a poorer neighborhood. Id. at 143–44. 
 223 See 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(d)(2)(i) (2021) (allowing defendants to use a predictive model de-
fense); HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 
42,854, 42,862–42,863 (Aug. 19, 2019) (codified as amended at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (proposing that 
defendants can attack assumptions about models and algorithms). The HUD justified these sweeping 
defenses of the algorithm by asserting that automated underwriting is a tool for assessing and access-
ing credit. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 
at 42,859 (stating that businesses have legitimate profit-seeking objectives). Instead of asserting a 
claim against a lender, the HUD suggests plaintiffs seek remedies from the creator of the model. See 
id. at 42,859–42,860 (conceding that the affirmative defenses allowing for models and algorithms are 
issues that require more comments and analyses). Even if a plaintiff does somehow successfully plead 
a disparate impact allegation, the available remedies are likely limited to equitable relief. 24 C.F.R. 
§ 100.500(f). 
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compared to other disparate impact standards, the proposed standard is drasti-
cally unfavorable towards plaintiffs.224 
B. The HUD Rule Cannot Coincide with the Inclusive Communities 
Decision: Factors Necessary for an Alternative Approach 
These are just a few ways that the HUD rule makes it more difficult to 
prove certain types of discrimination through discriminatory effects, and the 
heightened standards may halt some of the newfound access to relief for plain-
tiffs.225 Typically, with respect to housing discrimination allegations, plaintiffs 
will argue both disparate treatment and disparate impact in the alternative.226 In 
the absence of the ability to point to overt discrimination, disparate impact 
claims may allow a plaintiff to move forward in litigation, engage in discovery, 
and uncover concrete evidence of discrimination.227 Part II of this Note ana-
lyzed the statistics from the ninety-two FHA impact claims that reached an 
appellate court, where the court made a substantive decision on the Viable Ap-
pellate Cases.228 The Viable Appellate Cases, however, do not account for 
those cases where a plaintiff was allowed to advance theories in litigation and 
expose evidence of discriminatory animus.229 Further, it may be the situation 
that many of the robust disparate impact cases settle at the trial level.230 It is 
                                                                                                                           
 224 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (articulating disparate impact standards for Title VII employment 
discrimination); 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7 (2020) (articulating disparate impact standards for employment 
discrimination under the ADEA). Similar to the 2013 FHA disparate impact rule, Congress deployed a 
three-part burden-shifting test for Title VII disparate impact claims. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). First, 
the complaining party must show that a practice caused disparate impact based on a protected class. 
Id. Then the defendant must either demonstrate there is no disparate impact or that the practice is 
related to the job. Id. Finally, the plaintiff may show that there is a less restrictive alternative employ-
ment practice. Id. On the other hand, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission provides for a 
much more favorable standard for plaintiffs to prove disparate impact for age discrimination. See 29 
C.F.R. § 1625.7 (outlining the disparate impact based on age standard). The regulation begins with the 
presumption that any employment practice that adversely affects older employees is discrimination, 
but requires a plaintiff to prove that a policy caused the discriminatory effects. Id. § 1625.7(c). An 
employer has the exacting burden to present a “reasonable factor other than age” furthering a legiti-
mate business purpose. Id. § 1625.7(d). 
 225 See supra notes 154–163 and accompanying text (explaining that disparate impact cases are 
rarely brought and successful at the appellate level, but noting that a slight uptick in some cases has 
been seen). 
 226 See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 87, at 5–12 (arguing both theories of disparate treatment and 
disparate impact). Plaintiffs might also add underdeveloped disparate impact claims as a form of “in-
surance” in the event they cannot prove disparate treatment. Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, at 393. 
 227 See id. at 393 (arguing that plaintiffs will plead both disparate treatment and disparate impact 
in the alternative). 
 228 See id. at 392–93; see also infra Appendix (analyzing only disparate impact cases and no other 
claims). 
 229 See Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, at 393; see also infra Appendix. 
 230 See Seicshnaydre, supra note 154, at 390 n.209, 392 (clarifying that settlement data is likely 
inaccessible and cases that settle may be the strongest). 
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also important to keep in mind that FHA disparate impact cases are rare, and 
will seldom—if ever—be granted class action status.231 
As discussed, the final rule is an unacceptable recitation of the Supreme 
Court’s 2015 decision in Inclusive Communities.232 Still, the 2013 rule can no 
longer stand in light of the Court’s holding.233 The following proposed regula-
tion balances the elements that must be present in an FHA disparate impact 
regulation, under both the FHA and Inclusive Communities, and several of the 
guiding housing policies outlined in this Note.234 
At the pleading stage, instead of sufficiently pleading facts, a plaintiff 
must point to a specific policy or practice causing discriminatory effects to-
wards a protected class.235 Requiring a plaintiff to simply point to a policy re-
duces the burden of proving a negative.236 Second, instead of an amorphous 
                                                                                                                           
 231 Compare Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, 656 F. App’x 555, 557 (2d Cir. 2016), and infra Appen-
dix (demonstrating that the only FHA disparate impact class action to make it to the appellate court 
since promulgation of the 2013 rule failed class certification), with CORNERSTONE RSCH., supra note 
163, at 5 (demonstrating that plaintiffs in total filed 428 securities class action lawsuits in 2019 alone). 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s 2016 holding in Adkins v. Morgan Stanley demon-
strates why it is nearly impossible for plaintiffs to become certified as a class, at least in the lending 
context, because of the typicality, predominance, and superiority requirements in the FRCP. See FED. 
R. CIV. P. 23 (requiring typicality, predominance, and superiority for class certification); 656 F. App’x 
at 556–57 (affirming the district court ruling against predominance because there are too many factors 
affecting individual loans, which potentially caused different features). 
 232 See supra notes 195–224 and accompanying text (describing how the proposed rule does not 
reflect the Supreme Court’s analysis in Inclusive Communities and creates unnecessary burdens for 
the plaintiff); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2522–24 (2015) (elaborating on FHA disparate impact pleading requirements), remand to 795 
F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2015), remand to C.A. No. 08-CV-00546, 2016 WL 4494322 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 
2016). 
 233 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–24 (stating limitations on the 2013 rule 
and indicating some new requirements). 
 234 See 42 U.S.C § 3604 (using language allowing for disparate impact claims); see also Inclusive 
Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–24 (explaining some of the key limitations on disparate im-
pact claims). The primary purpose of disparate impact liability is to eliminate the “artificial, arbitrary, 
and unnecessary barriers,” without ignoring legitimate interests. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. at 2522–24 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)). To achieve this pur-
pose, disparate impact liability should, first, be limited to allow leeway for valid interests served by 
the policy in question. Id. Second, it should also permit defendants to have latitude to consider rele-
vant market factors. Id. Finally, statistical disparities absent a specific policy or procedure with “ro-
bust causality” to discriminatory effects will not support a claim for disparate impact under the FHA. 
Id. 
 235 See Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–24 (stating that a plaintiff must “point” 
to a policy that causes discriminatory effects). The Court does not, however, require a sufficiency 
standard for allegations merely pointing to a policy. See id. (stating that a “disparate-impact claim 
relying on statistical disparity must fail if the plaintiff cannot point to a defendant’s policy or policies 
causing that disparity”). 
 236 See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 Fed. Reg. 
70,921, 70,924 (Nov. 16, 2011) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100) (admonishing a burden that would 
require a party to prove a negative or facts that the plaintiff could not possibly know). For example, a 
requirement that a plaintiff prove that a policy does not advance any legitimate interests is proving a 
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“robust causality,” the causation requirement should mandate either alleging 
particular facts or producing statistics demonstrating a link between the policy 
and the disparate impact.237 For example, allowing lenders to discretionarily 
deny loan modifications, which statistically leads to a higher probability of 
foreclosure on minority homes, identifies a policy and establishes requisite 
causation.238 
If a plaintiff can meet this burden, instead of allowing for sweeping de-
fenses regarding predictive tools, the defendant still has an opportunity to rebut 
the plaintiff’s allegations by identifying a valid interest the policy achieves.239 
A valid interest should be a good-faith, informed, and non-discriminatory in-
terest related to the defendant’s particular industry.240 For example, as the 
Court suggests in Inclusive Communities, a zoning board may have legitimate 
interests in costs, traffic patterns, and historical value.241 Finally, as in other 
disparate impact contexts, a plaintiff should have the last opportunity to prove 
that the defendant can achieve this valid interest in a less discriminatory man-
ner without imposing material costs on the defendant.242 
CONCLUSION 
Housing discrimination is an all-pervasive leviathan that has manifested 
in both the public and private sectors. Where there was once a regulatory gap 
between overt bigotry and facially neutral policies, disparate impact claims 
have opened a path for plaintiffs to seek redress. The U.S. circuit courts recog-
nized the need for this avenue of relief and, in 2013, the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) facilitated and standardized the re-
                                                                                                                           
negative. See id. The 2013 rule avoided this by shifting burdens. Id. The defendant could identify a 
valid interest, and the plaintiff could identify the least restrictive method for achieving that interest. Id. 
 237 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–24. 
 238 See Cnty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 993–94, 999 (N.D. Ill. 2018) 
(holding that the plaintiff successfully pointed to a policy that led to lenders’ issuing disproportionate 
amounts of subprime loans to minority applicants); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text 
(describing the reduced causality requirement, but noting it still remains consistent with precedent). 
 239 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–23. Although the Court does say the purpose 
of disparate impact claims is to eliminate “artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary” policies, the Court 
places the burden of necessity on the defendant. Id. (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431). 
 240 See id. (describing limited examples of valid interests). The HUD declines to elaborate on 
what a valid interest might be. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact 
Standard, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,288, 60,312 (Sept. 24, 2020) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100). Instead, the 
HUD states what a valid interest is not. Id. A valid interest is not “discriminatory, non-substantial, or 
otherwise illegitimate.” Id. 
 241 Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. at 2522–23. 
 242 See id. (comparing the burden-shifting framework in FHA claims to Title VII claims). The 
Court stated that the valid interest portion of the burden-shifting framework for FHA disparate impact 
claims should be comparable to the business interest portion of the burden-shifting framework for 
Title VII disparate impact claims. Id. Title VII allows a plaintiff to rebut the business interest with a 
less restrictive policy. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). 
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quirements for disparate impact liability. Claimants have begun to gain access 
to this narrow type of recourse. Still, the frequency of disparate impact housing 
cases is low and success rates even lower. 
In 2019, in response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Texas 
Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Pro-
ject, Inc., the HUD proposed a new rule. This final rule simultaneously height-
ens the standard required for plaintiffs to bring disparate impact housing alle-
gations, makes it easier for defendants to quickly remove cases from court, and 
removes monetary consequences for discriminatory practices. Although the 
HUD grounded its justification in quasi-legal and policy arguments, the new 
rule is likely unsubstantiated and unnecessary to advance the relevant interests. 
Instead, the HUD should adopt a new regulation that balances plaintiffs’ 
need for a legal avenue to discover potential disparate treatment, defendants’ 
latitude to engage with the market, and the HUD’s obligation to comport with 
Supreme Court precedent in Inclusive Communities. Such a rule might look 
like a hybrid of the three-part burden-shifting test, including some of the Su-
preme Court’s concerns but allowing for more leeway to reach discovery. 
MITCHELL E. FELDMAN 
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